India has decided to lease two MQ-9B drones from the United States to keep a strict vigil over its maritime boundaries. These high-tech drones will continuously monitor every single movement in the surrounding seas until the delivery of the 31 ordered MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian drones officially begins in 2029 for full-time operations. The answer to why the Indian government took this step is itself enough to explain the core operational requirements of the Indian Navy.
In fact, there is often a major misconception among the general public regarding naval strength. People tend to believe that a navy’s greatest power lies in how much destruction a fleet can unleash once a war breaks out. But the reality is quite different. A navy’s most critical responsibility is accomplished long before a single bullet or missile is fired. A warship that arrives at the scene after a crisis has already erupted has, strategically speaking, failed in its primary role. Its true value lies in being deployed at the right place at the right time, well before the crisis unfolds, thereby shaping and influencing the decisions of potential adversaries.
The primary role of any navy is not to fire guns or launch missiles after a conflict begins, but to prevent the war from starting in the first place. A warship arriving at the scene after a conflict has begun is already strategically behind. The true worth and power of that vessel resided in its presence before the tension flared up. Its sheer presence sends a strong signal to adversaries, instilling caution and forcing them to think a hundred times before attempting any misadventure.
True naval power in the open seas is not measured merely by destructive capacity or sheer firepower. Instead, it is defined by how consistently a navy maintains a presence and forward deployment across sensitive, strategic maritime routes.
Stressing India’s maritime vision, former Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh wrote that to become a formidable maritime nation, India strictly requires a highly capable, wide-reaching, and continuously deployed navy. In a vast oceanic expanse like the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the physical presence of your warships itself becomes the country’s foreign and security policy.
Furthermore, recent geopolitical developments in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden have made the entire world realize that a powerful navy is not just a tool for defending maritime boundaries. It acts as the ultimate lifeline safeguarding a nation’s economy, energy supply lines, and international trade. When Houthi rebels launched attacks on commercial merchant vessels in the Red Sea, shipping freight and insurance rates skyrocketed. India too had to deploy warships in the region to escort India-bound vessels and to provide a security net from Somali pirates.
No matter how modern or destructive a warship parked at a home port might be, it cannot deter an enemy. However, that exact same warship, when actively patrolling a strategic choke point day and night, instantly alters the security dynamics of the entire region.
The fundamental rule of forward deployment is simple: your strength can only exert pressure on an adversary if it is positioned somewhere they are forced to factor into their tactical planning. A navy that spends most of its operational life anchored close to its home shores, no matter how formidable it looks on paper, carries little real weight in daily strategic calculus.
Strategically, the most crucial ships are often those that do not appear to be doing anything flashy or dramatic from the outside. They simply carry out persistent patrolling for weeks, maintain constant surveillance, and hold their positions in maritime zones where their absence would immediately be felt. Their true power is realized not in a single massive attack, but in the reassurance they extend to allies and the quiet deterrence they instill in rivals. Major strategic outcomes are not decided by a single isolated event, but by who remains consistently present at sea and who vanishes.
Today, the Indian Navy is far more indigenous, technologically advanced, and capable than ever before. In 2026, its command rests in the hands of dynamic and fresh leadership. On May 31, 2026, Admiral Krishna Swaminathan officially took charge as the 27th Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) of the Indian Navy. A distinguished expert in Communications and Electronic Warfare, Admiral Swaminathan has previously commanded premier frontline warships, including INS Mysore and the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya.
The Indian Navy is among the world’s strongest navies. The pace of its capability building has seen a distinct and noticeable acceleration over the past few years. In 2025 alone, the Navy commissioned 12 ships and submarines. According to official government figures, over 177 ships and submarines have been constructed and commissioned in India to date. Furthermore, all 52 warships slated for induction in the next phase are currently being built domestically, while orders for an additional 75 ships and submarines are reported to be in the final stages of approval.
Yet alongside these achievements lies a stark reality: India’s maritime domain is immense. Considering economic interests across the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, Lakshadweep, the major sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden, the current fleet cannot be evaluated simply by total ship counts, but by how many vessels can actively remain at sea simultaneously.
This raises a crucial question: even with India building ships rapidly, is the pace sufficient?
And it is precisely from this dynamic that the core question arises: India is building warships at a rapid pace, but is this momentum truly sufficient?
The straightforward answer to this question lies within this piece: India is moving rapidly in the right direction, but given the sheer vastness of the ocean and China’s expanding naval power, it will need to advance even faster and with greater strategic balance.
In truth, the real test of a modern naval power is not merely how many warships a nation possesses. The ultimate test is how continuous, persistent, and sustainable the physical presence of those warships actually is. This is the fundamental difference between sheer firepower and forward presence.
It is right at this intersection that a whole new chapter in the Indian Navy’s grand strategy begins.
An advanced destroyer berthed in a harbor or domestic shipyard regardless of its missile complement or sophisticated radar retains most of its military potential purely as ‘potential power’ while docked. Though powerful, it lacks a physical presence in the maritime zone where an adversary must actively calculate its threat.
Conversely, when that same vessel is deployed near a sensitive sea route, a vital choke point, or a crisis-prone area, its role shifts entirely. It ceases to be just a warship and becomes an operational variable for opposing military planners.
If an adversary’s leadership must consider the constant presence of an Indian warship, 24-hour coverage by Indian maritime patrol aircraft and the unknown location of an Indian submarine before deciding their next move, the strategic value of that posture may far exceed a missile that is never launched.
This is the true essence of deterrence.
Often, the greatest success of naval power is not initiating or winning a war, but eliminating the possibility of war altogether. A navy fulfills its strategic purpose even when its ships are not firing weapons. Continuous patrolling, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), joint exercises with friendly nations, escorting merchant shipping, and maintaining a constant presence across critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) create a framework where an opponent must constantly calculate the cost of their next move.
Therefore, asking “How many total ships do we have?” is important, but a far more vital question is: “How many of those ships are actively deployed at sea when they are needed most?”
In naval doctrine, distinguishing between forward presence (or forward deployment) and surge capability is essential.
Consider a scenario where a crisis escalates rapidly, requiring a nation to deploy warships to a sensitive maritime area:
First Option (Forward Presence): Your warship is already patrolling within or immediately adjacent to the area.
Second Option (Surge Capability): Upon receiving news of the crisis, a warship is dispatched from a naval base hundreds of miles away.
At the onset of a crisis:
Forward Presence = Immediate deterrence and operational control (instant impact).
Surge Capability = Departure from naval base plus transit time (inherent risk and potential delay).
Surge capability retains its own importance, as additional forces can be dispatched during an escalation. However, surge capability and forward presence are not interchangeable.
If tension rises in a contested maritime zone and your ship is not already there, the initial critical hours and days of the crisis can slip away. Attempting to alter the situation later by deploying more ships may come after the opposing side has already secured tactical and political advantages. Distances at sea are vast; ships can move fast, but they cannot teleport overnight.
This is why forward deployment carries such weight in naval strategy. A ship arriving during a crisis represents a response; a ship present before the crisis represents deterrence.
For India, this distinction is critical because its maritime responsibilities are not limited to a single coastline-
The Indian Navy’s challenge is not simply a matter of “how many powerful ships” it possesses, but how long a real presence can be sustained across multiple locations in such an expansive maritime theater.
A warship cannot remain deployed at sea indefinitely. It requires routine maintenance, crew rotations, refueling, resupply, repairs, training, and periodic long-term overhaul refits. Consequently, naval planners rely on concepts like the ‘Rule of Three’ to calculate actual force availability.
Under this framework-
Total Fleet Required = On Station + Transit / Working Up + Maintenance / Refit
While not a rigid universal law, since actual availability varies by platform type, mission profile, maintenance cycles and operational requirements, the underlying rationale remains solid.
If India requires the continuous (24/7) presence of a single warship in a critical maritime sector, the Navy must maintain a minimum fleet of three ships of that class. If that sector requires a permanent task group of three ships, the fleet must have access to at least 9 to 10 equivalent vessels.
This gives rise to the concept of ‘fleet depth’. Acquiring a large, modern warship generates headlines, but keeping it operationally active at sea requires a network of additional warships, fleet tankers for logistical support, repair facilities, and trained crews behind it. Ultimately, a navy’s true strength is measured not by a single headline-grabbing vessel, but by the operational architecture that keeps it continuously mission-ready.
Recent years have proven significant for the Indian Navy in terms of domestic shipbuilding.
Government figures indicate that 51 major warships valued at approximately ₹90,000 crore are currently under construction across various shipyards nationwide. Since 2014, Indian shipyards have delivered over 40 indigenous warships and submarines to the Navy. Over the past two years, an average of one new vessel has been inducted into the Navy roughly every 40 days. Furthermore, nearly 67 percent of the Navy’s capital acquisition over the past decade has been sourced through the domestic defense industry.
This represents a notable shift. Where India once relied heavily on imported platforms for its naval needs, current acquisitions including destroyers, frigates, aircraft carriers, submarines, survey vessels, anti-submarine craft and support ships, are rooted in domestic shipyards and indigenous design ecosystems. However, it remains necessary to distinguish between headline numbers and actual operational capability.
While monthly ship commissionings reflect positive momentum, not all inducted vessels carry identical combat value:
Measuring naval inductions purely through raw numbers can obscure actual force strength. The pertinent questions remain:
The contemporary Indian Navy is far more than a collection of surface vessels. Its surface fleet has transitioned rapidly toward modern guided-missile destroyers and stealth frigates. The Visakhapatnam-class (Project 15B) destroyers highlight advances in domestic shipbuilding and combat systems integration, while the Project 17A Nilgiri-class frigates combine stealth, advanced sensor suites, and long-range missile capabilities.
New ships are being added at a remarkable speed. The joint commissioning of INS Dunagiri, INS Sanshodhak, and INS Agray in June 2026 illustrates this integrated approach:
INS Dunagiri: An advanced stealth frigate built under Project 17A.
INS Sanshodhak: A large hydrographic survey vessel.
INS Agray: An Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC) designed for coastal operations.
All three platforms originated from the Indian Navy’s Directorate of Naval Design and the Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE) ecosystem. According to official data, these vessels feature over 75 percent indigenous content, incorporating components from more than 200 MSMEs.
This single commissioning event reflects three distinct operational requirements of a modern navy:
A modern navy is not defined solely by missile-carrying platforms; it functions as an integrated network of sensors, aircraft, submarines, survey craft, logistics support and real-time data links.
Recent years have brought welcome news from India’s defense manufacturing sector. State-owned shipyards such as Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers (GRSE), and Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) have significantly accelerated construction timelines. Statistical data indicates that the Indian Navy is commissioning an average of three to four vessels per month.
Behind these positive figures, however, lies a more complex reality. The vast majority of these three to four monthly inductions consist of smaller platforms. These primarily comprise Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), Hydrographic Survey Vessels, and Anti-Submarine Warfare Shallow Water Craft (ASW-SWC).
While these smaller assets are vital for securing India’s 7,500-plus-kilometre coastline and littoral zones, they lack the endurance and capability to counter larger PLA Navy destroyers and frigates in the open waters of the High Seas.
As former Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh observed, “India is practically an island country with land borders.” India’s economic vitality is inextricably tied to the maritime domain. To support a target national GDP of $30 trillion, India must look beyond coastal patrol craft. The nation needs to triple its production rate of 7,000 to 10,000-tonne destroyers, 6,000-tonne guided-missile frigates, and attack submarines. High numbers of small craft may pad statistics, but they cannot bridge strategic vulnerabilities in the open ocean.
The Indian Navy currently operates two aircraft carriers: INS Vikramaditya and the domestically produced INS Vikrant.
The significance of INS Vikrant extends beyond providing a second operational carrier; it represents India’s entry into indigenous aircraft carrier design and construction. INS Vikrant features approximately 76 percent domestic content. Its structure incorporates 30,000 tonnes of specialized naval-grade steel supplied by the Steel Authority of India (SAIL), built through a supply chain involving over 550 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and more than 100 MSMEs.
Measuring 262 metres in length with a displacement of roughly 45,000 tonnes, INS Vikrant operates as a floating airfield capable of sustaining fixed-wing and rotary aviation operations.
However, operating two carriers introduces a core strategic dilemma: are two platforms sufficient to maintain a continuous, concurrent carrier-based presence across both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal?
This operational requirement highlights two key concepts in naval warfare:
India’s strategy extends beyond defensive coastal protection (Sea Denial); it aims to function as a primary net security provider across the Indian Ocean Region (Sea Control).
Should a crisis require the deployment of a Carrier Strike Group off the western seaboard (Arabian Sea) while simultaneously maintaining a presence on the eastern seaboard (Bay of Bengal), the absence of a third carrier owing to routine maintenance and refit cycles creates an immediate operational gap.
Consequently, the debate surrounding a third aircraft carrier is not merely a quantitative comparison against China’s carrier fleet. The core issue is whether India can sustain continuous, carrier-based naval aviation across multiple operational theatres.
The forward deployment of an aircraft carrier provides a clear historical example of tactical power and psychological leverage, as demonstrated during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.
Just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1971, India’s first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, suffered a serious technical failure in one of its primary boilers. This casualty reduced the vessel’s maximum speed to between 14 and 16 knots. Naval experts cautioned that launching combat aircraft at such low speeds presented extreme risks, recommending that the vessel remain safely berthed in port.
However, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral S.M. Nanda and Eastern Naval Command leadership opted for a forward deployment, stationing the damaged INS Vikrant in the Bay of Bengal.
This forward posture fundamentally altered the operational landscape:
Neutralizing PNS Ghazi: The Pakistani Navy deployed its long-range, US-built submarine PNS Ghazi specifically to target Vikrant. Misdirection and perimeter defenses near Visakhapatnam led to the destruction of the Ghazi off the eastern coast.
Total Maritime Blockade of East Pakistan: Aircraft operating from Vikrant including Sea Hawks and Alizés, executed continuous strikes against port facilities in Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar, and Chalna, effectively sealing off the Bay of Bengal.
Isolation Leading to Surrender: The blockade cut off resupply and evacuation routes for Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, applying immense pressure that ultimately contributed to the surrender of 93,000 troops in Dhaka.
The events of 1971 demonstrate that a carrier’s primary value is not limited to kinetic strikes; its mere presence can force an adversary to abandon their broader operational plans.
India demonstrated a modern iteration of this carrier-centric power projection during Exercise MILAN 2026 in February 2026. The multilateral exercise featured 42 warships and submarines, 29 aircraft, and participation from 18 partner navies. The event concluded aboard the flight deck of INS Vikrant, highlighting the platform’s role in contemporary Indian maritime diplomacy.
It is frequently argued in defense circles that India can readily interdict the Strait of Malacca from its bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, cutting off critical Chinese energy imports. Roughly 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports transit this narrow choke point a vulnerability famously termed the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by former Chinese President Hu Jintao.
From a practical naval perspective, however, the concept of a Malacca choke point is increasingly becoming a strategic myth.
Aware of its exposure at Malacca to interdiction by India and its QUAD partners (the United States, Australia, and Japan), Beijing has developed alternative access routes. Deeper waterways through the Indonesian archipelago, such as the Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait, allow PLA Navy nuclear submarines (SSNs) to enter the Indian Ocean submerged and undetected.
Simultaneously, China has established a network of military and commercial facilities around the Indian Ocean perimeter often referred to as the ‘String of Pearls’:
China’s presence is no longer confined to the Malacca Strait. By deploying frigates, destroyers, and hydrographic survey vessels on regular patrols throughout the Indian Ocean, China directly challenges India’s traditional sphere of influence. Countering this requires India to maintain a persistent, forward-deployed presence across the broader theater.
While the Indian Navy’s surface fleet continues to modernize, its subsurface fleet presents significant operational challenges.
Surface ships can be tracked by satellites and aircraft by radar, but detecting a modern submarine operating in deep water remains one of the most difficult tasks in naval warfare. India maintains a sea-based nuclear deterrent via nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs like INS Arihant and INS Arighat). However, its conventional attack submarine fleet (SSKs) faces numerical strain.
The Navy’s older Sindhughosh-class (Kilo-class) and Shishumar-class (Type 209/HDW) submarines are approaching the end of their operational service lives. While the induction of six Kalvari-class (Scorpene) submarines under Project 75 provided a modern baseline, delays in follow-on procurement programs have created force-structure gaps.
The slow progress of Project 75(I) which aims to acquire six new submarines equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems has extended the production timeline. Delays in submarine construction create operational shortfalls as older hulls retire before replacement platforms are commissioned.
This shortfall takes on added significance when evaluating regional submarine developments. Pakistan has contracted with China for eight Hangor-class submarines (four being built in China and four at Karachi Shipyard). Equipped with AIP technology, these platforms can remain submerged for extended periods without snorkeling.
Addressing this threat requires more than purchasing large surface combatants; it necessitates a comprehensive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) network:
P-8I Poseidon Aircraft: Long-range maritime patrol aircraft utilizing sonobuoys to locate targets over vast ocean areas.
MH-60R Seahawk Helicopters: Ship-borne ASW helicopters equipped with dipping sonar and lightweight torpedoes.
ASW Shallow Water Craft: Coastal platforms designed to counter littoral submarine incursions.
A frequently overlooked area of naval warfare is Mine Countermeasures (MCM) specifically Dedicated Mine Countermeasure Vessels (MCMVs) or minesweepers.
Naval mines represent a low-cost, asymmetric method of denying access to sea lanes and harbors. Disabling or restricting the movement of an aircraft carrier or destroyer does not necessarily require an expensive anti-ship missile; laying sea mines at harbor approaches can force entire fleets to remain at anchor.
At present, the Indian Navy operates zero dedicated modern mine countermeasure vessels, following the decommissioning of its older minesweeper classes.
Although MCMVs have been designated as priority acquisitions under recent defense self-reliance frameworks, the absence of active hulls leaves a vulnerability in harbor defense and route clearance. While multi-role vessels are currently tasked with mitigating this gap, dedicated minesweepers remain an operational requirement.
The impact of mine warfare is evident in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian mining capabilities influence regional shipping dynamics. During previous escalations, international coalitions were called upon to deploy specialized minesweepers to maintain open transit lanes. The Indian Navy has faced delays in acquiring new MCMVs, with previous procurement attempts canceled over the past two decades.
India’s primary strategic asset remains its geography. Extending into the Indian Ocean as a prominent peninsula, India sits adjacent to major global sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
To convert geography into operational utility, robust naval infrastructure is required:
Project Seabird (Karwar): Located in Karnataka, Karwar is being expanded into one of Asia’s largest naval bases. Phase-I provided basing for 10 vessels; Phase-IIA is designed to support 32 major surface combatants and submarines alongside 23 yardcraft.
Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC): Positioned across the Bay of Bengal, this joint command serves as a forward maritime node monitoring the western approaches to the Strait of Malacca.
INS Jatayu (Lakshadweep): A strategic facility in the Arabian Sea designed to enhance surveillance over regional shipping routes and the sea lines surrounding the Maldives.
A navy’s peacetime role extends beyond combat readiness to include regional engagement, capacity building, and maritime diplomacy. In August 2026, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Krishna Swaminathan conducted an official visit to Mauritius, focusing on maritime security cooperation, hydrographic support, and joint capacity-building initiatives.
This visit reflects a strategy aimed at maintaining the Indian Ocean as a shared, secure maritime space. Tasks such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), anti-piracy patrols, and transferring patrol vessels to friendly island nations build operational partnerships that support regional stability.
Summarizing these factors yields a comprehensive equation for modern sea power:
Naval Power=Firepower+Numbers+Availability+Presence+Logistics+Surveillance+Industrial Capacity
High firepower without adequate ship numbers prevents sustained, distributed deployments. Possessing hulls without reliable logistics and maintenance infrastructure restricts operations far from home ports. Similarly, relying on a slow domestic shipbuilding process risks fleet obsolescence over a ten-year horizon.
The Indian Navy has successfully transitioned from a ‘Buyer’s Navy’ to a ‘Builder’s Navy,’ demonstrated by the domestic construction of 51 major vessels. However, achieving the strategic objectives set for 2047 requires advancing from a ‘Builder’s Navy’ to a sustained, long-range ‘Blue-Water Navy.’
India does not need to mirror the hull counts of the PLA Navy, as China faces different geographic constraints. India’s primary theater remains the Indian Ocean, where the strategic imperative is maintaining credible, continuous maritime superiority.
This represents the core objective of forward presence and the future orientation of the Indian Navy.
Can deployment concepts and strategic formulas alone secure India’s maritime domain? Moving beyond conceptual planning to analyze the Navy’s actual budget allocations, economic multiplier effects, shipbuilding unit costs, and specific capability gaps reveals deeper structural challenges. How does merchant trade protect national GDP? How does every ₹1 invested in domestic shipbuilding yield ₹1.82 in wider economic output? What are the operational risks associated with a zero-minesweeper baseline and a shrinking conventional submarine fleet? Facing a PLA Navy fleet exceeding 400 vessels, what roadmap should India implement leading up to 2047?
Read the next and final installment of this series for data-driven analysis, expert commentary and India’s 5-point future naval action plan- Part 2: Data, Economics, Force Structure, and the Future Naval Roadmap.
Lower per-tonne freight costs, sharply lower fuel use, multimodal terminals, Jalvahak incentives and private investment are shaping a system in which heavy cargo can move by river for the longest, most efficient leg of journeys.
Ask who owns a stretch of national highway, or an embankment, or the tunnel wall at Silkyara. The honest answer is often several departments, none of whom will admit it first. A road, a bridge, a drainage channel should each belong to one named office, the kind that gets credit when it holds and blame when it doesn’t.
India’s goal now should not be just to become a ‘Builder’s Navy’, but a ‘Fast Builder’s Navy’. This means freezing designs, placing large orders together and never letting shipyard assembly lines sit empty.
Selected issues, clear explanations and thoughtful perspectives—delivered when we publish.
