The effort to find out what lies beneath India’s soil is faster at present than ever before. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) ran 195 exploration projects on critical minerals in 2024-25, and the number rose to 230 in 2025-26. Of the 88 critical and strategic blocks put up for auction since November 2023, 56 have been sold. But amid this pace of exploration, there is also a bitter picture. According to NITI Aayog’s Trade Watch (September 2026), India is 100% dependent on imports for lithium, cobalt and nickel. Imports of metals and ores rose from $32.2 billion in 2015 to $60.5 billion in 2025.
Recognising this weakness, the government has framed policies across the entire value chain. The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), launched in January 2025, is to spend about Rs 34,300 crore over seven years, under which the GSI is to complete 1,200 exploration projects. There is a Rs 7,280 crore scheme to make rare earth magnets, with a target capacity of 6,000 tonnes a year. A Rs 1,500 crore scheme for recycling, a national stockpile of critical minerals and the announcement in Budget 2026-27 of rare earth corridors in four states are also part of the same effort. On 4 November 2026, the Union Cabinet approved a Rs 2,814 crore capital subsidy scheme for the processing of lithium and nickel.
Yet the question remains who will ultimately benefit from these schemes. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), critical minerals account for about a quarter of the cost of a battery cell, but only around 3 per cent of the price of an average electric car. The real power lies with whoever refines these minerals. The IEA’s 2026 report says that in 2025 the largest country’s average share in the refining of leading critical minerals, excluding rare earths, was 72%. When China imposed licence requirements on exports of seven heavy rare earth elements in April 2025, many carmakers had to cut or halt production. Australia’s example says the same: the value of mining there is about $15 billion, while that of refining is only $4 billion. China’s refining alone is valued at about $106 billion.
That is why the central question of this report is whether India will remain merely a country that digs out raw minerals, or will be able to build the entire chain from mining to processing, refining and finished goods. The report tests this against figures: how many of the 30 critical minerals are found in the country, how many of the agreements made abroad have reached the ground, how much processing capacity India has, where it stands against China, Australia, Chile and African countries, and what share will fall to the people in the areas where mines will open.
The journey from a mine to an electric vehicle is divided into many stages. Take lithium: first the mine is opened and the ore is extracted. Then it is crushed and ground, and the lithium-bearing portion is separated. After that, a chemical process produces a pure substance such as lithium carbonate or lithium hydroxide. From it the battery cathode is made, then the battery cell and battery pack, and finally the electric vehicle or an energy storage system. Each stage needs different technology, different capital and a different business operator. In industry language, the first stage is called upstream (mining), the middle stages midstream (processing and refining) and the last downstream (finished products).
IEA data show where the money is made. As mentioned above, critical minerals account for about a quarter of the cost of a battery cell, but only around 3 per cent of the price of an average electric car. Rare earth elements make up about 40% of the cost of a permanent magnet, but less than 1 per cent of the value of the entire vehicle. By the IEA’s reckoning, even if the price of rare earths tripled, the cost of a car would rise by only 0.1 per cent.
In other words, the price of the raw material looks small in the final product, but whoever holds the middle link has a grip on the world’s supply. China’s strength lies in this very link. According to UNCTAD, the United Nations trade agency (June 2026), China mines 69 per cent of the world’s rare earth mine output and 78 per cent of its natural graphite. Its hold on processing is even firmer. According to a September 2025 report by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), in 2024 China held more than 90 per cent of rare earth processing, about 90 per cent of graphite, about 80 per cent of cobalt and about 70 per cent of lithium chemicals.
Australia’s example shows that being ahead at the mine is not enough. It is among the world’s leaders in lithium mining. According to a report by the rating agency CareEdge Global (2024 figures), the value of mining of major energy minerals in Australia was about $15 billion, while that of refining was only $4 billion. China’s refining alone was valued at about $106 billion, more than seven times Australia’s entire mining value.
India has the opposite example as well. According to NITI Aayog, India accounts for 12.1 per cent of global lead exports, although the country’s lead reserves are very small. In India they are about 19 lakh tonnes, against 3.5 crore tonnes in Australia. India is ahead because it built a recycling industry that extracts lead from old batteries. A network for collecting old batteries, low processing costs and extended producer responsibility (EPR) in the 2022 battery waste rules made this possible. The lesson is that even without a mine, a place in the value chain can be built through processing and recycling, provided policy, waste collection and private investment all come together.
On the recommendation of an expert committee of the Ministry of Mines (constituted in November 2022), the government released in 2023 a list of 30 critical minerals. It includes names such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, graphite, rare earth elements, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, platinum group elements, antimony, gallium, germanium, tin and molybdenum. The list also has fertiliser minerals such as phosphorus and potash, because agriculture depends on imports of them. That is, ‘critical’ does not mean merely ‘rare’, but ‘one whose supply, if stopped, could bring the economy to a halt’.
In the public documents of the Ministry of Mines, the GSI and the Indian Bureau of Mines, there appears to be no single official figure stating how many of these 30 minerals are available in the country. The reason is that ‘availability’ has four different levels:
There is a wide gap between these four. News that a mineral has been found in an area is not proof that a mine will start or that the country will be self-reliant.
Based on government documents and reports, the picture can be roughly divided into three parts. This is not an official government classification:
Citing the Ministry of Mines, it has been reported that in 2024-25 India imported about 1.247 crore tonnes of critical minerals. By value, platinum group elements, phosphorus, nickel, molybdenum and tin were at the top of these imports. NITI Aayog has separately given figures for five of the 30 minerals:
NITI Aayog’s document has another figure on copper: about 96 per cent of the demand for copper ore and concentrate is met by imports and only 4 per cent by domestic mining. The two figures seem to measure different things, but the picture is the same: a large part of consumption comes from abroad. In graphite, dependence is 28 per cent, but for batteries its type matters. Madagascar and Tanzania account for 66.6 per cent of natural graphite imports, while China accounts for 52.3 per cent of synthetic graphite imports. According to NITI Aayog, China controls about 90 per cent of the world’s anode manufacturing capacity. That is, finding a graphite mine in Odisha does not mean battery-grade graphite will be produced; that needs separate processing.
One aspect is often missed in news reports. Many rare minerals are not extracted separately but come as by-products of the processing of copper, zinc and lead. According to the IEA, this is why base-metal smelters are very important for the security of these minerals. That is, the midstream structure of India’s copper-zinc-aluminium industry is also part of this story.
Rare earths: According to government figures, India has about 1.315 crore tonnes of monazite, which holds an estimated 72.3 lakh tonnes of rare earth oxide. It lies mostly in the sands of the sea coasts of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Odisha alone is reported to have about 31.6 lakh tonnes of monazite. On this basis India is counted third in the world in rare earth resources. In Rajasthan, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has confirmed a resource of 1,11,845 tonnes of rare earth oxide in the Bhati Khera-Siwana area of Balotra district. This is an estimated resource in the ground, not goods available in the market.
Lithium: The greatest confusion is here. In February 2023 the GSI reported 59 lakh tonnes of ‘inferred’ (G3-level) lithium ore resource in the Salal-Haimana area of Reasi district, Jammu and Kashmir. The Mines Minister told Parliament that the average lithium content of this ore is 583 ppm (parts per million) and that it is found within bauxite. This means that about 583 grams of lithium will come out of every tonne of ore. Rough arithmetic based on this figure puts total lithium metal at about 3,400 tonnes. This is not an official figure, but it makes clear that the headlines of ‘59 lakh tonnes of lithium’ were talking about the weight of the ore, not of pure lithium. In the government’s reply the international price of lithium carbonate was given as about $15,000 a tonne. It was also reported that this is a clay-type deposit, whose large-scale commercial mining has not yet been proven anywhere in the world.
In Katghora in Chhattisgarh’s Korba district, an initial survey found lithium content between 10 and 2,000 ppm. A gap this wide shows that the information is still raw. In Degana in Rajasthan there is a block with tungsten and lithium, and in Mandya in Karnataka there are reports of small-scale exploration.
The rough rule for the level of exploration is laid down in the United Nations classification (UNFC). G4 is the earliest stage, that is, a rough survey of the area. G3 involves preliminary exploration, G2 general exploration and G1 fully detailed exploration. An investor usually wants data at G2 or beyond, because before putting thousands of crores of rupees into a mine, they must know how much ore there is and of what kind. The Reasi block went to auction at the G3 level, and this is considered a major reason it did not sell.
There appears to be no official list in the public domain showing how many mining agreements abroad there are for each mineral. What information is available shows that agreements are mainly around lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel and rare earths.
The government front abroad is handled by Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL). It is a joint company of NALCO (40 per cent) and Hindustan Copper and Mineral Exploration and Consultancy Limited (MECL) (30 per cent each). Its biggest step is in Argentina. On 15 January 2024 it signed an agreement with CAMYEN, the state-owned company of Catamarca province, for the exploration and development of five lithium-brine blocks. This agreement, worth about Rs 200 crore, covers about 15,703 hectares of land. Brine-type lithium means extracting lithium from the salty water beneath the ground. The second phase of exploration drilling is reported to be complete.
But the report of the parliamentary committee in August 2026 gives a different picture (according to a Reuters report):
At the government level the list of agreements is long. According to a July 2026 Business Standard report, there are a strategic framework for critical minerals cooperation with the United States, a first joint working group with France, investment in nickel and rare earth magnet manufacturing in Indonesia, and a Quad commitment. Agreements for overseas mining by Indian companies have been signed with Argentina and Zambia. Cooperation is growing with Japan, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Vietnam and South Africa. There are preliminary talks with Chile, Congo, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique and Saudi Arabia. Hyderabad’s Midwest Limited became the first Indian private company to acquire critical mineral resources abroad, through an agreement with Indonesia’s state-owned PERMINAS.
The conclusion of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF)’s June 2026 analysis is harsh. According to it, since 2024 only the partnership with Australia is a partnership in the real sense, involving five projects (about $600 million) and a 20 per cent stake each in two lithium projects. Most of the rest are memoranda of understanding (MoUs) or joint declarations, to which binding conditions on technology transfer, shared processing plants or co-investment have not yet been attached. An MoU does not mean India has got ownership of a foreign mine.
The NCMM has set targets of acquiring 26 mineral assets abroad through public sector companies and 24 through the private sector. These are targets, not the number of completed acquisitions.
The attitude of resource-rich countries is also changing. According to ORF, in April 2026 Brazil’s President Lula said that Brazil would no longer be content with just exporting minerals and would want partnerships with more value addition and technology transfer. This means that acquiring mining rights abroad is getting harder, because such countries now want processing set up at home. According to the CEEW study, India’s refining technology and equipment are still limited, and this is its real test.
NITI Aayog’s Trade Watch assesses that India’s mining sector is still lagging in processing, refining and value addition. The figures make the picture clear.
Copper is the clearest example. Copper is needed everywhere: in electrical wiring, transformers, electric vehicles and solar power. The only copper mining company in the country is Hindustan Copper Limited, which is struggling with operational inefficiencies, and Sterlite’s plant in Tuticorin has been shut. China has more than 44 per cent of the world’s copper processing capacity. Copper imports have more than tripled in ten years to $11.8 billion, and are now among India’s biggest imports.
In India, mining rights are obtained through auctions. Companies bid on how much premium they will pay the government over the price of the mineral. Under the rules, at least three technically qualified bidders are required, or the auction is cancelled. This year the Ministry of Mines has proposed lowering that threshold to two, to raise the success rate. The auction figures:
In sum, the auction record has improved overall, but investors remain hesitant on critical mineral blocks involving new and risky exploration. In the fifth round in May 2025, 15 blocks were offered and 10 were sold.
Getting a block at auction is not the same as starting production. Katghora is an example. The country’s first auctioned lithium and rare earth block went to Kolkata’s Macky South Mining Private Limited at a premium of 76.05 per cent. According to reports, the company had been formed only about three years before the bidding. The block measures 256 hectares, of which 84.86 hectares is forest land. In November 2025 it was said that mining would begin ‘soon’, and on 31 August 2026, at an event attended by Chhattisgarh’s Chief Minister, it was again described as the country’s first auctioned lithium block. That is, nearly two years after the auction there is no news of commercial production.
What are the reasons for no bids coming in? NITI Aayog’s report lists the usual problems of mines: the burden of royalty and cess, auction premiums, and delays in auctioned blocks becoming operational. The Commission has suggested a single-stage sealed bid with a ‘realistic’ reserve price, and a fixed timeline for re-auction and for starting mines. In cases like Reasi, the level of information and the lack of infrastructure were also major reasons.
Another aspect of the auctions concerns the sharing of earnings. The auction premium and royalty go to the state governments’ accounts. That is, when a mineral is found, the first earnings go to the state, and after that to the company running the mine. The earnings from refining and finished goods do not come into this calculation at all, because they arise outside the mine, often in another country.
Rare earths: the resource exists, the middle link is missing. At present rare earth processing in India is almost entirely in the hands of the state-owned Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL). According to ORF’s analysis, IREL makes low-value rare earth chlorides and oxides in ageing facilities. It has units at Chatrapur (OSCOM) in Odisha and Aluva in Kerala. The work where the most value is created, that is, separating the individual elements, making metal and making alloys, is, according to ORF, done outside the country, where China’s technological hold is strongest. ORF, citing the IEA, writes that 80 to 90 per cent of the value is created in these stages.
For this reason India imports almost all its permanent magnets. According to ORF, the country consumes 4,000 to 5,000 tonnes of them each year. In November 2025 the government approved a Rs 7,280 crore scheme, which the Ministry of Heavy Industries notified on 15 December 2025. The aim is a capacity of 6,000 tonnes a year of sintered NdFeB magnets, in five units of 1,200 tonnes each. The scheme runs for seven years, with a two-year preparatory period. The proposed capacity is more than today’s consumption, but ORF’s concern is that the scheme supports only the last three stages: oxide to metal, metal to alloy, and alloy to magnet. There is no separate concrete incentive to make those oxides in the country. ORF calls this the ‘midstream gap’. That is, even if magnets begin to be made in the country, if their raw material comes from outside, dependence on China will merely shift one link back.
The state of other minerals: CEEW examined the processing capacity of 15 of the 30 minerals. Of these, seven are commercially processed in the country: copper, graphite, rare earths, silicon, tin, titanium and zirconium. But this is not a conclusion that domestic demand is met. According to the report, the capacity to make very high-purity products is inadequate, and domestic capacity for primary processing of lithium, nickel and cobalt is limited. The report lists three obstacles. First, laboratory versus factory: extracting a few kilograms of material in a laboratory and processing hundreds of tonnes of ore every day are not the same thing, and techniques such as solvent extraction, ion exchange and high-pressure acid leaching are yet to be developed. Second, machines and chemicals: for equipment such as autoclaves, solvent extraction units and electrowinning cells, India depends on China, Japan and Europe. Third, low-grade ore: many of India’s resources are low-grade, so processing them may cost more than in the international market.
The question of cost: The IEA has written that the capital cost of refining projects outside China is 20 per cent to more than 150 per cent higher, and operating cost about 50 per cent higher on average. So refineries will not be built on the market’s faith alone. The IEA has suggested tools such as grants, government equity, concessional loans, price floors and purchase guarantees, and has called this additional cost a ‘minerals security premium’, that is, insurance paid to guard against risk. The IEA also notes that new projects worldwide have tilted more towards the mine: announced rare earth refining capacity outside China by 2035 will equal about two-thirds of expected mining supply, while planned magnet production will be only one-third.
Government schemes: The National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), launched in January 2025, has government expenditure of Rs 16,300 crore and estimated investment by public sector companies of Rs 18,000 crore, making about Rs 34,300 crore in total over seven years. Under it the GSI is to complete 1,200 exploration projects between 2024-25 and 2030-31. The August 2025 amendment to the mining law allowed critical minerals to be added to existing leases without additional royalty. In October 2025 a critical mineral stockpile was announced, with a two-month reserve of rare earths and an initial sum of Rs 500 crore. There is a Rs 1,500 crore scheme for recycling, which aims to process about 2.7 lakh tonnes of material from e-waste and battery waste every year and to recover about 40,000 tonnes of critical minerals.
A provision of Rs 500 crore has been made for four mineral processing parks. Budget 2026-27 announced rare earth corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the abolition of basic customs duty on monazite and exemptions on capital goods related to processing. Even so, ORF warns that the corridors do not yet say where and how the separation and refining units will be built. NITI Aayog has noted another concern: if black mass (a mixture of metals) from old batteries is sent abroad instead of being recovered within the country, raw material for the domestic recycling industry could shrink.
Each country has chosen a different path, and the comparison makes India’s position clear. The figures below are from UNCTAD (June 2026), the IEA, CEEW and NITI Aayog.
China: China produces 69% of the world’s rare earth mine output and 78% of its natural graphite. However, its true dominance lies in processing, where it controls roughly 90% of global capacity for rare earths and graphite, 80% for cobalt, and 70% for lithium chemicals. Additionally, its share of global copper smelting rose from about 15% in 2005 to 50% by 2025. The key lesson from China is that it successfully captured the critical middle link of the value chain alongside its mining operations.
Australia: As a global leader in lithium mining, Australia highlights a major structural gap: while the value of its mined energy minerals reached approximately $15 billion, its refining value accounted for only $4 billion. Australia demonstrates that being ahead in mining is no guarantee of high earnings. To address this, the country is now committing around $7 billion in processing production incentives alongside a $1.2 billion strategic projects fund.
Chile and Latin America: Latin America accounts for about 40% of global copper production and nearly a quarter of all lithium mining, yet it refines only a fifth of the energy minerals it extracts. The region illustrates the untapped potential of downstream development; according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), if refining were carried out locally, Latin America’s economic value could increase by roughly 50% to approximately $220 billion by 2035.
Congo and Africa: The Democratic Republic of the Congo mines around 73% to 74% of the world’s cobalt, but China dominates the refining process. Africa’s position underlines how resource-rich nations are increasingly leveraging their reserves; when the Congo imposed export quotas, global cobalt prices surged by around 130%. Following similar strategies to retain value, Zimbabwe has introduced restrictions on raw lithium exports, while Mozambique has placed curbs on graphite.
Indonesia: Indonesia generates approximately 67% of global nickel mine output and holds about 43% of the world’s nickel refining capacity. The lesson from Indonesia shows the power of assertive state policy: by banning raw ore exports and establishing domestic smelters, the country successfully expanded its industrial footprint and now commands about 22% of global nickel exports.
India: India remains in the early phases of critical mineral development, focusing primarily on exploration and block auctions. While Indian Rare Earths Limited (IREL) handles domestic rare earth processing, the nation still faces severely limited processing and refining capacity for key minerals such as lithium, nickel and cobalt.
A pattern is visible in these examples. Countries that took control of processing along with minerals, such as China and Indonesia, gained more earnings and bargaining power. Those that stayed at mining alone, such as Australia and Congo, are now having to change their policies.
India’s position is weak against all these. Its share in the world’s roughly $2 trillion metal-ore import market is only 1.8 per cent. China accounts for 25 to 43 per cent of India’s major metal imports. In NITI Aayog’s figures, Argentina’s share in imports of lithium oxide and hydroxide is 32.5 per cent, Belgium’s 25.6 per cent and China’s 22.6 per cent. In cobalt imports, Belgium’s share is 58.3 per cent and South Africa’s 27.4 per cent. Names like Belgium are centres of trade and processing, so the mineral was not necessarily mined there. In nickel imports, China’s share is 26.2 per cent, Japan’s 13.5 per cent and the United States’ 9 per cent.
Demand is about to grow rapidly. S&P Global Mobility estimates that demand for lithium-ion batteries for EVs could rise about 35-fold between 2023 and 2035, and the government’s target is for EVs to make up 30 per cent of new sales by 2030. That is, India will become a big buyer, but if processing stays abroad, the earnings will go abroad too. According to the IEA, if trade in battery-grade graphite were to stop completely, more than $300 billion a year of downstream production outside China could be at risk. This is a problem not only of mining but also of the EV and battery industry.
According to NITI Aayog, Odisha accounts for 38.4 per cent of the country’s total mineral production, Rajasthan 23.2 per cent, Chhattisgarh 13.5 per cent and Karnataka 10.1 per cent. The first three states together produce more than three-quarters. The hopes and questions about critical minerals are concentrated in these states and Jammu and Kashmir.
The Siwana Ring Complex in Balotra district has emerged as a new home of rare earths. Surveys by the GSI and the Atomic Minerals Directorate have found rare earths and heavy rare earths here, and the DAE confirmed 1,11,845 tonnes of rare earth oxide at Bhati Khera. In August 2026 Rajasthan became the first state in the country to act on an exploration licence for an auctioned rare earth block. In June 2026 RSMET, a body of the state mines department, signed an agreement with IIT (ISM) Dhanbad to look for tungsten, lithium, cobalt, nickel and rare earths in mining waste dumps. More than half of the country’s copper reserves are believed to lie in the state, and the entire output of lead-zinc ore comes from here. In 2025-26 the state mines department’s revenue was Rs 9,620 crore. On the other hand, the auction of the Degana tungsten-lithium block was cancelled in July 2026. Two potash and halite blocks went to Hindustan Zinc and Oil India in May 2025, but these are blocks for exploration and subsequent permission for mining, not operating mines.
The lithium of Reasi is the biggest unfulfilled hope in this story. In the first auction in November 2023 three qualified bidders could not be found. It was auctioned again in March-May 2024 and that too failed. The Ministry of Mines then asked the GSI to re-explore up to at least the G2 level before holding the next auction. In February 2024 the Union Territory’s mining secretary had said that local people would be involved in the project regardless of their skills. The government had also told Parliament that there are scattered houses in the area, which means questions of land for mining and local rights will accompany it. There is no firm public information yet on the latest status of this block in 2026.
Odisha leads in mining and is also the biggest home of rare earth processing. It yields 100 per cent of the country’s chromite, 72.5 per cent of bauxite, 55.6 per cent of iron ore and 39.6 per cent of graphite. In Chatrapur in Ganjam is IREL’s Odisha Sands Complex (OSCOM). According to an October 2026 Business Standard report, Odisha is the first state to frame an integrated rare earth corridor (Gopalpur cluster) on the Ganjam-Puri coast, where extraction, separation, metal production and permanent magnet manufacturing will all be in one place. Rs 10 crore has been set aside for this in the 2026-27 state budget.
Katghora in Korba is the country’s first auctioned lithium-rare earth block. In August 2026 the Chief Minister said that there is potential for lithium and rare earths in Katghora and Bastar, and for graphite, vanadium and gallium in Balrampur. One hundred per cent of the country’s tin production comes from Chhattisgarh, and the public sector has an 87.6 per cent share in tin concentrate. Even so, tin is among India’s biggest critical mineral imports, which shows that the scale of production is far behind demand. The state has expressed hope of heavy revenue from 65 auctioned mineral blocks, but that is an estimate, not revenue realised.
The state’s main contribution is in traditional minerals: 16.1 per cent of manganese ore and 15.6 per cent of iron ore production. NITI Aayog’s table also shows nickel resources in Karnataka, and there are reports of small-scale lithium exploration in Mandya. The Ministry of Mines’ G2-G3 records mention exploration for manganese-cobalt at Taralghatta in Shivamogga and for rare earths at Gundlupet in Chamarajanagar. Recent, verified state-level data on critical minerals in Karnataka is scarcely available in the public domain.
For people affected by mining, the legal share is the District Mineral Foundation (DMF). Under it every leaseholder has to pay a part of the royalty (10 to 30 per cent, depending on the date of the lease). Under the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY), this money is to be spent on works such as drinking water, health and education. In January 2024 the Centre changed the guidelines and raised the minimum limit of spending on these high-priority areas from 60 to 70 per cent. The arrangement exists on paper, but the figures show that getting the money to the ground is another matter:
It is important to grasp the scale of the total unspent amount. Rs 57,587 crore is greater than the total estimated seven-year expenditure of the National Critical Mineral Mission (about Rs 34,300 crore), and about 20 times the Rs 2,814 crore of the processing scheme approved on 4 November. These audits describe the state of the DMF system in mining-affected areas; they are not evidence of irregularities in any new critical mineral block. But they show that the passing of mining earnings on to local development cannot be taken for granted. Leaseholders of new blocks will also contribute to this same system. The difference is that mines for these minerals will often be small, so royalty and DMF sums are likely to be lower than from big mines of iron ore and coal. This is an estimate, which will have to be tested against each block’s production target.
The question for the communities at the places where the real value will be created, that is, the processing hubs, is different. The rare earth corridors are to be built in coastal areas. According to ORF, coastal mining carries the risk of erosion, effects on fishermen’s livelihoods, weak environmental controls, and protests, litigation and delays because of little dialogue with communities. ORF has written that along with the corridors a clear framework is necessary on land acquisition, Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) clearances, sharing of royalty between the Centre and the states, and disposal of radioactive waste arising from monazite. In Katghora, 84.86 hectares of the block is forest land, so forest clearance and the role of local gram sabhas will be important there.
On local employment, promises are currently greater than results. In Jammu and Kashmir, local participation was promised, but mining has not even begun. In Ganjam, on 31 December 2025, the district administration and IREL held a workshop to link local small industries to IREL’s procurement, which is a good beginning, but its results are yet to come. There is another layer. According to NITI Aayog, the 2026 amendment to the mining law seeks to make mining projects viable by limiting state-level taxes and cesses. Analysts have expressed concern that this could affect the financial autonomy of states and the way mining earnings reach communities. The real effect will be clear only from the text of the amendment and the states’ responses.
By the figures, the sharing of earnings across the four layers from mine to product looks like this:
Mine: State governments earn from the auction premium and royalty. The company running the mine, which is sometimes new and small, takes the risk. Public sector companies (Hindustan Copper, IREL) hold near-monopolies on some minerals.
Processing and refining: This is where the most value is created, and where China and Indonesia are ahead. In India this layer is the thinnest.
Final product: Magnets, battery cells and motors. Citing a recent IEA report, it was noted that in 2025 a large share of lithium-ion battery cell production was with Chinese, Korean and Japanese companies, and China’s share alone was well over 80 per cent.
Communities: Limited to the DMF and local employment, and even there nearly half the money goes unspent.
The conclusion is that if India remains confined to the mine, it will get state revenue and some jobs, but not the profit that comes from refining and products. The IEA has a reassuring point too: critical minerals are a small part of the final product’s price, so the additional cost of diversified supply, the ‘security premium’, can largely be borne. If rare earth prices tripled, a car’s price would rise by only 0.1 per cent, and if battery materials became three times as expensive, the price of an EV would rise by about 5 per cent.
There is another side too. Easing of China’s export controls may come, and if cheaper goods begin to arrive from China, expensive domestic refinery projects could go into loss. The IEA itself accepts that costs are higher outside China, so refining will struggle to survive without subsidy, and the burden of subsidy will be borne by taxpayers. Indonesia’s model also demands an environmental price. And in government figures the pace of exploration looks fast, but getting from mine to production often takes a decade.
Three tests emerge from ORF’s analysis, against which further progress will be judged. First, a separate incentive for the middle link, that is, separation, refining and metal production. Second, binding conditions on technology transfer and co-investment in foreign agreements. Third, a clear framework along the processing corridors on land, coastal clearances, royalty sharing and disposal of radioactive waste.
One date is still being watched. In October 2025 China announced sweeping new export controls on rare earths and related products. In November 2025 these were suspended until 10 November 2026. The April 2025 controls, under which licences are required for exports of seven medium and heavy rare earth elements, were already in force and were not suspended.
Now, according to Announcement No. 58 of 2026 of China’s Ministry of Commerce and customs department, the suspension of the October 2025 controls will continue from 11 November 2026 to 10 January 2027. Before that, on 28 September 2026, the ministry had said that the term of the trade arrangement with the United States had been extended to 10 January 2027. This relief is for two months, and nothing is yet settled about what happens after 10 January 2027. Whatever is decided, it will affect all importers, India included.
On Wednesday (4 November 2026) the Union Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approved the ‘Capex Support Scheme for Promoting Critical Mineral Processing’. Union Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw gave the information at the Cabinet briefing.
After the approval the Prime Minister asked on X whether India should depend on other countries for the processing of critical minerals that power the country’s future. He gave his own answer: ‘I do not believe so at all.’
PM Modi wrote that lithium, nickel and cobalt are essential for EVs, batteries, electronics and defence, yet India is heavily dependent on imports of refined material. Among the scheme’s highlights, he listed new processing plants, a capital subsidy to increase investment, more value addition in the country and stronger supply chains. According to him, the principle is clear: India should have the capability to build the technologies of the future.
In the government statement issued on the PIB, the problem is put this way: the processing of critical minerals is concentrated in a few places in the world, which leaves the supply chain vulnerable to geopolitical shocks, price fluctuations and possible restrictions. In the statement the government accepted that the domestic infrastructure for beneficiation and processing of lithium, nickel and cobalt is still at an early stage, so India is largely dependent on imports for refined intermediates and high-purity material. Challenges such as the high capital required for commercial projects, the lack of suitable technology and limited access to raw material were also listed.
The main provisions of the scheme, according to the government statement, are:
Earlier, Minister of State for Mines Satish Chandra Dubey had said at an event that the government does not want dependence on imported oil to be replaced by dependence on imported critical minerals. The government claims that the NCMM touches the entire value chain: exploration, mining, processing, recycling and overseas assets. As evidence, it cites record auctions, a rising number of exploration projects, the magnet scheme and the corridors. NITI Aayog has also spoken of the same ‘entire value chain’ approach.
When the scheme is set against the figures above, four things emerge.
The decision heads in the direction of the very link where the figures show the biggest weakness: Lithium and nickel, for which, according to NITI Aayog, India is 100 per cent import-dependent. The government’s acknowledgement that the domestic processing infrastructure is at an early stage matches the picture from NITI Aayog, CEEW and ORF. Many players in industry have welcomed the step.
Scale: Add up the maximum support for the four plants: two beneficiaries at Rs 500 crore and two at Rs 900 crore come to Rs 2,800 crore, nearly the whole scheme amount. According to the IEA, the capital cost of refining projects outside China is 20 per cent to more than 150 per cent higher, whereas here the subsidy is up to 30 per cent of the investment.
Scope: The government’s details mention only lithium and nickel. The separate incentive for making rare earth oxides and metal that ORF has demanded is not in this scheme. The separate Rs 7,280 crore scheme for rare earth magnets and the Rs 1,500 crore scheme for recycling already exist.
Raw material: The government itself listed ‘limited access to raw material’ as a challenge. The scheme talks of processing ores or intermediate products, but the country has no major operating lithium or nickel mining, production from the Argentina project is four to five years away, and the public details do not say where these plants will get their raw material. This question will decide how much of the earnings from processing stay in India.
India has shown in lead that a mine is not necessary for gaining a place in the value chain. Our lead reserves are very small, yet our share of global exports is 12.1 per cent, because we built an entire industry to extract lead from old batteries. When the collection network, processing and rules all came together, the result followed. In critical minerals, this is the test India faces in the coming years.
The picture now is that announcement, approval and actual production are three different stages, and India mostly stands in the first two. Add up the maximum support for four plants in the Rs 2,814 crore scheme and nearly the whole amount goes. Where the plants will get their raw material is not in the public details. Lithium extraction in Argentina is still four to five years away. And for the communities on whose land the mines operate, Rs 57,587 crore lies unspent in the District Mineral Foundations (DMFs). This sum is greater than the seven-year expenditure of the entire National Critical Mineral Mission.
What lies under the ground remains only a reserve under the ground until the nation builds the industrial capability to refine it, make metal out of it and mould it into something useful. Whoever holds the middle link decides price, supply and bargaining. In the coming months, it will be decided whether India is able to take this link into its own hands, or whether the biggest share of profit once again goes across the border.
On 26 October 2026, the Ministry of Civil Aviation notified the Bharatiya Vayuyan Niyam 2026, operationalising the 2024 Adhiniyam. This decisive legal consolidation terminates the archaic Aircraft Act of 1934, equipping agencies like the DGCA with uncompromising statutory mandates and transforming India’s aerospace architecture.
The war will not end because of an election. But the election changes who decides how it is paid for. From January, Democrats will control both houses of Congress, and under the US Constitution, it is Congress that controls the money.
Brain-stem death must be certified before families can authorise donation. Doctors then assess organs, coordinators find suitable recipients and retrieval teams work against time, with strict legal rules governing every stage of the donation process
Selected issues, clear explanations and thoughtful perspectives—delivered when we publish.
