dhruv
I’m a researcher and writer interested in politics, history, media, and contemporary affairs. My work focuses on digging into facts, examining narratives, and understanding the ideas and events shaping India and its public discourse.
For most of the past 18 months, the India-US trade deal has been described as ‘almost done’. In February, the two governments unveiled a framework. In June, the US Ambassador to India said negotiators were working on the “last one per cent”. In September, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump spoke by phone. And yet, last week, both sides admitted publicly that the deal is stuck.
On October 1st, 2026, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer told ANI that he did not think a deal was “imminent”, though both delegations had now identified the full universe of sticking points. A few days later, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman went further, speaking in New Delhi; she said the negotiations had reached a “plateau” beyond which further give-and-take would be “very, very difficult”.
Sitharaman also admitted that the US wants to reduce its trade imbalance with India and make up for all it believes it has lost over the years. “When you’re talking of trade and trade imbalance being the sole criteria to reduce the imbalance, to what extent beyond negotiation can you go,” she asked.
It would be easy to see this as a failure of Indian diplomacy, but it is better understood as a choice. Over the past year, New Delhi has witnessed the European Union, Japan and South Korea sign trade arrangements with the Trump administration, accepting higher tariffs, pledging hundreds of billions of dollars in investment and opening their markets, only to see the legal ground under those tariffs shift months later. India has learned a different lesson: a deal signed in a hurry, especially on Washington’s terms, can cost far more than the tariff relief it buys.
This article looks at how the talks reached this point, how Washington’s view of India has changed, what other countries gave up, why Indian agriculture and energy are red lines, and why waiting may be the smartest move New Delhi has left. It also looks honestly at the risks of that strategy.
The deal has been “nearly done” at least three times, and each time the ground shifted under it. On February 13, 2025, Modi and Trump launched the bilateral trade agreement talks with a plan to finish the first tranche by autumn 2025. What followed was a year of negotiations and disagreements
When talks collapsed in mid-2025, Washington imposed a 25% “reciprocal” tariff on Indian goods. From August 27, 2025, an extra 25% tariff was imposed as a penalty for buying Russian oil. At 50%, India faced one of the highest US tariff rates in the world, higher than China, Vietnam or Bangladesh at the time.
On February 6–7, 2026, India and the US issued a joint statement. The US cut its tariff on most Indian goods to 18% and dropped the Russia penalty. Trump claimed India had agreed to stop buying Russian oil, though New Delhi never confirmed it. In return, India agreed to cut or remove tariffs on US industrial goods and some farm items, such as dried distillers’ grains, tree nuts, soybean oil, fruit, wine and spirits. Crucially, India kept wheat, rice, maize, soya, poultry, milk, cheese and other sensitive products out of the deal, and its ban on GM crops stayed in place. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said India had given no concessions that would hurt its farmers. Throughout the talks, India’s focus has stayed on protecting its farmers and dairy sector, which we discuss later in this article.
On February 20th 2026, the ground shifted again, but not in Trump’s favour. The US Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Trump had no authority to impose sweeping “reciprocal” tariffs under a 1977 emergency-powers law. Within hours, the situation for both India and the US became uncertain as the White House announced a temporary 10% global tariff. India had just negotiated from 50% to 18%, but now every country, deal or no deal, was going to face the same tariff of about 10%. According to the Think Tank GTRI, India had effectively agreed to a worse rate than doing nothing. In response, New Delhi said that it would sign only after Washington settled their new tariff system. But Washington started working on the other side; it opened a Section 301 investigation. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and retaliate against foreign trade practices that burden or restrict U.S. Commerce. The investigation examines alleged excess industrial capacity in several countries, including India. In simpler terms, it was just another tactic to put pressure on and make the tariff legal in a different way. Then, on September 18, Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. It is a law that provides the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries, including India and China, that continue to buy Russian oil and gas.
If you read it together, the timeline makes India’s position look less like stubbornness and more like common sense. Each time India got close to signing, the price on the other side of the table changed.
Till now, we have talked about the situation that has already happened; India has reached a point where it is not rushing, but in this section we’re going to understand how the relationship itself has changed. For nearly two decades, Washington’s viewpoint towards India has completely changed from being an asset to a competitor.
2014 was the year of change for India. For the first time in history, a single non-Congress party formed the majority in the country. Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of India. With the new government, a new relationship was sought to be established between New Delhi and Washington. In September 2014, PM Narendra Modi visited the US. Both nations agreed to deepen their strategic partnership, focusing on defence, trade and investment, energy, technology, maritime security and cooperation in other countries. Modi also met Obama and major American business leaders to push these areas forward.
In 2016, Washington designated India a “Major Defence Partner”, a status meant to raise the defence trade and technology sharing to the level of America’s closest allies. Then the two militaries signed three foundational agreements in quick succession:
The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was signed in August 2016. LEMOA is an agreement that lets the Indian and US militaries use each other’s bases for refuelling, repairs and supplies. Under the agreed conditions, it doesn’t mean India is giving its bases to America.
The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement was signed in September 2018 at the first India-US “2+2” ministerial dialogue. It allows India and the US to use secure, encrypted military communication systems. It also gives India access to advanced American communication equipment on US-made platforms it already flies, such as the C-17, C-130J and P-8I aircraft. So, their forces can communicate sensitive information more safely during exercises or operations.
The Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation was signed on October 27, 2020, during the border standoff with China. BECA completed the set of key foundational agreements between the two countries. It allows India to receive high-end US geospatial information, such as satellite and mapping data, which can improve the accuracy of Indian missiles, drones and other military systems.
In 2018, India was elevated to Tier 1 of the U.S. Strategic Trade Authorization (STA-1) for high-technology exports, a privileged status typically reserved for treaty allies. USA’s logic was straightforward: a strong India would serve as an effective counterweight to China. Foreign policy scholars often described America’s posture during this period as ‘strategic altruism’, the practice of aiding a partner’s rise without demanding immediate transactional payback, on the calculation that an empowered partner inherently advances long-term U.S. security interests.”
While India and the US were building a strong defence partnership, trade remained the weak link. In 2019, the first Trump administration ended India’s status under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). It is a programme that gave preferential, often zero-tariff, access to certain products from developing countries. The decision meant thousands of Indian products that had entered the US duty-free lost that benefit. Washington argued that India had not provided equitable access to its own market. New Delhi objected, saying its trade policies were meant to protect its development needs and public interest. The issue remained a sore point for years. Disputes over farm market access, medical device pricing and intellectual property also stayed unresolved, and India imposed retaliatory tariffs on several US products after Washington raised duties on Indian steel and aluminium. By Trump’s visit to India in 2020, the two sides had deepened their strategic and defence ties, but a broader trade deal remained elusive. In simple terms, Washington was ready to treat India as an important security partner long before it was willing to treat it generously as a trading partner.
By early 2022, the partnership looked stronger than ever. The defence pacts were signed, and the Quad had been elevated to a leaders’ summit. Washington spoke of India as a natural ally against China. Then in February 2022, the turning point came. The Russia-Ukraine war started, and geopolitical dynamics changed overnight. The major concern for Moscow was NATO, and for that reason, the US was supporting Ukraine against Russia.
The US asked Europe and other countries to boycott Russian products, but India refused to take sides. It did not condemn Moscow at the UN and called repeatedly for dialogue. India rejected the US calls to join the G7 price cap on Russian oil, citing its strategic autonomy. But why did India refuse to fall in line with Washington? India refused to support the boycott call for its own national interests. India started buying discounted Russian crude in large quantities to keep fuel costs and inflation down for its own people. India’s military still depends heavily on Russian equipment, and its tradition of strategic autonomy means it won’t let any one power choose its partners. Moreover, it also saw a double standard, since Europe itself kept buying Russian energy and later the USA did the same, which we will talk about in the article later.
Before the war, Russia supplied about 0.2% of India’s oil. But the discounted Russian crude oil helped to overtake Iraq as India’s biggest supplier by October 2022. Within two years, the share rose to 35-40%. While speaking on the issue of buying Russian oil, Oil Minister Hardeep Puri argued that global oil prices would have shot up sharply if India had not bought that oil. But for Washington, it was different. They saw it as India helping to fund Moscow’s war. It might sound like an official reason, but according to the expert Brahma Chellaney, Trump’s tariffs on India had “little to do with energy and everything to do with power”. Washington was never going to accept that India challenged its authority by refusing the US order. India chose its own interests while being neutral in the war, not by accepting any side. India negotiated on some issues but never gave up its red lines.
The clearest sign of how far things have shifted came not from New Delhi but in the language of Washington. In March 2026, US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said in Raisina Dialogue that the US would not give India the kind of economic advantages that allowed China to become a major competitor. His exact words were blunt: “We are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago.”
It’s not only him. Strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney has also argued that Trump’s tariffs were a political signal that a rising India is now seen in Washington “as an economic rival to be constrained” rather than a partner to be cultivated. He has also pointed to Washington’s warming ties with Pakistan as evidence that the US is willing to work against India’s regional interests. Not everyone agrees on how deep this shift runs. Some US officials still call India one of America’s most important strategic partners, and the two countries signed a 10-year defence framework in October 2025. But the problem lies in the actions the US takes towards India, which make it pretty clear that Washington sees India as the next China to be contained. And if that is the case, then a trade deal written entirely on American terms is not a neutral bargain. It is a tool.
We have analysed that India didn’t bow down under U.S. pressure by taking any sides. For 18 months, the deal has been struck, but how can one say that India’s waiting tactic might be helpful or not? The best way to find out is to see what happened to the other countries and why they said yes quickly. In mid-2025, most countries were facing threats of 25- 30% tariffs. Countries including America’s closest allies each walked away with a 15% tariff plus a long list of promises.
Let’s start with Europe. As S. Jaishankar once famously said, when asked why India would not side with Europe against Russia: “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” On July 27, 2025, at Trump’s golf resort in Turnberry, Scotland, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed to a deal that still divides Europe.
Under the deal, the US imposes a 15% tariff on most EU goods. Before Trump, the average rate had been about 4.8%, so European exporters saw their tariffs roughly triple. The EU cut its own tariffs on US industrial goods to zero, and pledged $750 billion in US energy purchases and $600 billion in investment in the American economy. The reaction inside Europe was brutal. French Prime Minister François Bayrou called it “a dark day”. He wrote that an alliance of free peoples had “resigned itself to submission.” Germany’s car industry said the 15% tariff would cost its companies billions every year. A researcher at the Kiel Institute described it as a bad deal, barely better than the 30% Trump had threatened. One European commentator summed it up: the EU made almost all the concessions, in exchange for a US promise to only punish Europe up to a certain limit.
Von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, defended it as “the best we could get”. That may well be true, given Europe’s dependence on US security guarantees. But that is precisely the point. Europe signed from a position of weakness, and it paid for it. After Europe, Trump’s deal reached to the Japan and South Korea.
Asia’s two biggest US allies followed the same script. Japan was the first big ally to sign the deal. On July 22, 2025, Trump announced it on Truth Social in his typical style: “We just completed a massive Deal with Japan, perhaps the largest Deal ever made.” He also added that Japan would invest $550 billion into the United States “at my direction”, with America receiving “90% of the Profits”. In exchange, Japanese goods would face a 15% tariff instead of the threatened 25%. According to the White House, Japan agreed to buy 100 Boeing planes, raise US rice purchases by 75%, buy $8 billion of American farm goods, and increase defence spending with US firms to $17 billion a year.
Just eight days later, South Korea followed the same script. On July 30, 2025, Trump again announced it himself, calling it a “Full and Complete Trade Deal.” He wrote that South South Korea would give the US $350 billion for investments “owned and controlled by the United States, and selected by myself, as President,” while “America will not be charged a Tariff.” Korean goods would face a 15% tariff instead of 25%. Korea also pledged $100 billion in US energy purchases and gave up the near-zero tariffs it had enjoyed under its 2012 free trade agreement with the US, shielding only rice and beef. In other words, an existing FTA partner ended up paying more, not less. Trump later demanded the money in cash up front, and Seoul had to negotiate it down to instalments of $20 billion a year.
Even after so much drama, Trump’s tariff didn’t survive. In February 2026, the US Supreme Court struck down the emergency powers he had used to impose them. Tariffs collapsed legally, and a temporary 10% global rate took their place. You might expect that to have freed the countries that signed, but it did not, as tariffs are a tool that is used by Trump to bully their allies. The White House said it expected all partners to keep honouring their commitments on lowering trade barriers, which it said had not changed. In May 2026, the EU went ahead and ratified its deal. So the countries that rushed locked in permanent concessions such as zero tariffs on US goods and an investment pledge, in exchange for tariff relief that a court partly erased within months. India’s framework was not free either. It included an intent to buy up to $500 billion of American goods over five years. But much of that is energy, aircraft and technology India needed anyway. It has not been locked into a signed treaty. It also left the farmers and dairy sector untouched. For now, India is paying a lower tariff.
India is an agricultural country, and the Indian government can’t risk the lives of farmers under any US pressure deal. Washington has pushed for years for access to India’s markets for corn, soybeans, wheat, dairy and other farm goods. The stance of the Modi government seems crystal clear: there will be no compromise on the interests of annadata(the farmer who feeds the nation).
But why is the Indian government so concerned about the farmers? The answer lies in the data. According to the 2015-16 Agriculture Census, the average Indian landholding is just 1.08 hectares. It was around 2.3 hectares in 1970-71; basically, farms are getting smaller, not bigger. About 86% of Indian farmers are small or marginal, owning less than two hectares. Agriculture and allied sectors still employ roughly 46% of India’s workforce. In the dairy sector, the average farmer owns just two or three animals, too few to compete in the commercial market. India has been the world’s largest milk producer since 1998. It is built almost entirely on these small herds and village cooperatives. For these families, a fall in crop or milk prices is not a line in a company’s quarterly report. It is the difference between paying the school fees or taking on more debt. The stakes are huge. If we talk about data, dairy alone supports more than 8 crore farmers, and even if we go more precise, a large number of them are women, which also helps them to support their family financially.
In comparison to India’s agriculture, American agriculture looks very much different. Most US farms are still technically owned by families, but the production has become heavily concentrated in large operations. According to analysis of the 2022 US agriculture census, large farms are only about 4% of US farms, but those farms control two-thirds of US farmland. And if we talk about the dairy sector, the concentration is even sharper. Mega-farms with 2,500 or more cows are just 4% of US dairy farms but produce about 45% of all milk sold. In simple terms, a mega-farm is a massive, factory-style commercial farm that uses heavy machinery, high technology, and large-scale methods to produce industrial goods. Half of US dairy farms have fewer than 100 cows, and together they account for only 4% of sales. According to USDA data cited by the conservative Heritage-linked Daily Signal, from 2017 to 2022, the US lost nearly 159,000 family farms while the large operations kept growing. But even after losing a large number of family farms, how is the US dairy sector surviving? The answer lies in the large operations, which are also backed by government money. In the last census period, US government payments to farmers rose to $10.4 billion, but the larger and wealthier farms benefited the most.
We talked about both systems; now let’s put those two side by side, and the result is obvious. According to the State Bank of India, the estimated price of Indian milk is about ₹50 a litre, while the subsidised US milk, even after shipping and cold storage, could land in India at around ₹32 a litre. The difference is ₹18 a litre, which might not sound like much, but for a small local farmer whose profit lies between ₹5 and ₹12 per litre, it is bigger than his entire margin. No Indian farmer with just two cows can compete with that price. And it is not because he is inefficient, but because he is competing against scale and subsidies. The most powerful way to put it is this: even American small farmers cannot survive against American mega-farms. They are disappearing by the thousands. If America’s own family farmers cannot compete, how would a farmer in Vidarbha or eastern Uttar Pradesh with one hectare and two buffaloes?
It’s not only about the economics, but US cattle are often given feed containing animal-derived ingredients, which makes such dairy unacceptable to many Indian consumers for religious and cultural reasons. India also does not allow genetically modified food crops, while most US corn and soybeans are GM. Under the February framework, India kept its GM ban fully intact and allowed only limited imports like animal feed inputs.
For India, the second red line is energy. Washington wants India to cut its purchase of Russian crude. It argues that India is helping Russia finance the war in Ukraine. New Delhi’s position is that where it buys fuel is decided by the needs of 1.4 billion people, not by another country’s foreign policy.
In 2025-26, according to GTRI, Russia supplied about 30.3% of India’s crude imports, which are worth roughly $40.8 billion. The Helsinki-based Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimates that India took about 37% of Russia’s crude exports between December 2022 and August 2026, second only to China at 50%. GTRI noted that Russian oil has significantly lowered India’s import bill and helped keep inflation in check. That is why the new US law signed on September 18, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, matters so much. It allows the President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from the top buyers of Russian oil and gas. The 100% figure is a ceiling, not an automatic rate. The President can also waive the tariffs if he certifies to Congress that doing so serves US national interest. But the threat now sits in American law.
Recently, Finance Minister Sitharaman has laid out India’s argument in practical terms. In September, she said India could, in theory, walk away from Russia and buy elsewhere. But the moment it does, she warned, the limited pool of available oil “is going to shoot up in price.” She talked about the recent attacks on Saudi Arabia and damage to Gulf refineries, which have already limited the global supply. She also raised a technical point that rarely makes headlines. Indian refineries are largely set up to process medium crude, and oil from other sources may not suit them even with tweaks. If India buys oil its refineries cannot process, she asked, “whose cause are we then serving?”
There is a fact that weakens Washington’s complaint and is rarely discussed anywhere. India has been buying more American energy, not less. According to GTRI, India’s crude purchases from the US increased from $6.6 billion to $9.1 billion in 2025-26. The total energy imports from America reached $12.5 billion. Sitharaman also made it clear: India is diversifying its supplies. It is simply refusing to cut off one supplier overnight on command.
Trump expects India to accept his demand without even thinking about national interests. But he treats China very differently. China buys far more Russian oil than India does. Yet, in August 2025, Trump imposed a 25% tariff in the name of a Russia penalty on India while sparing China. According to the GTRI, it has warned that India may again face more pressure than China under the law. Because the President has wide discretion over which country to target and at what rate. But for India, it is about more than oil. It sets a precedent that Washington can dictate India’s energy security. With the latest update, the double standard became starker.
On October 9th, 2026, Trump announced that Russia would supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to American and global markets, with 500,000 more tons planned for November. Just a few weeks after signing a law that threatens India with tariffs of up to 100% for buying Russian oil, Trump issued a temporary license allowing Russian diesel into global markets until April 2027. Trump’s reason was simple: lower fuel prices for Americans ahead of the midterms. After blaming India for buying Russian oil and accusing it of sponsoring the Ukraine-Russia war, Trump did what a politician does to win an election. This is a kind of double standard we were talking about. US diesel prices have jumped about 67% since late February, when the conflict with Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the move “a weak decision” and “unworthy of our partners”. It is a lesson for India that when energy prices hurt American voters, Washington buys from Russia too; when India does the same for 1.4 billion people, it is called ‘funding a war.’
In this article, we have discussed how tariffs become a tool for Washington, and India refused to bow down under pressure. But why is India delaying or taking so much time to make this deal possible? There is no single answer to that, but if we put the pieces together, India’s go-slow approach starts to make sense and more like a strategy. It rests on five calculations.
The first problem the Indian side is facing is that nobody actually knows what America’s final tariff structure is, not even Washington. The US Supreme Court has already struck down one set of tariffs. The Section 301 investigation into industrial overcapacity is unfinished and could produce new duties. The Russia sanctions law adds a possible tariff of up to 100% on top. Since March, India’s position has been that it will sign once the US settles its tariff architecture. That is not stalling for its own sake. India is refusing to pay a fixed price for something whose value can change even after the ink dries. As the February framework proved, it showed that India’s agreed 18% was overtaken by a 10% global rate within two weeks.
The second calculation is that a deal might not buy the protection it promises. According to the GTRI’s Ajay Srivastava, a former Indian trade negotiator, he argues that the new US law “turns sanctions into a trade weapon against India”. His reading is that Washington will threaten tariffs of up to 100%, then offer a lower rate if India cuts Russian oil and accepts concessions in a deeply unequal agreement. Even then, he warns, a deal or a cut in Russian oil would not necessarily shield India from future US action under Section 301 or other trade laws.
Srivastava has a memorable name for these arrangements. In his view, what Washington offers are not traditional free trade agreements but “MASAL” deals: Mutually Agreed Settlements Achieved through Leveraged Arm-twisting. If that is what is on the table, there is little point in rushing to sign.
The third calculation is about American politics. As early as April 2026, it was reported that India was likely to go slow on the talks until the US midterm elections gave more clarity on the American political landscape. According to the sources quoted in the report, the logic was explained simply: if the Trump administration loses ground in the midterms, its negotiating position may weaken, allowing New Delhi to push for greater concessions.
Those elections are now less than four weeks away. US Ambassador Sergio Gor has also said that Trump’s planned state visit to India will not happen during the midterm campaign. According to some analysts, it argues the pressure cuts the other way too: Trump would like an India deal as a headline win before the vote. If Washington is in a hurry for its own political reasons, to show Americans that he is possibly the Greatest American President in history. It is worth being precise here. Some commentators believe that India is simply waiting for Trump to leave office. But it is unlikely to be the plan, since his term runs until January 2029. India cannot freeze that deal for so long. Waiting for midterms, a court ruling or the end of the Section 301 probe is a far more realistic bet.
The fourth calculation is that India is no longer as dependent on the US as it was a year ago. In a better way, India is looking to diversify its trade options rather than depending on a single country. It signed a trade deal with the UK in 2025 that gives almost all Indian exports duty-free access. In January 2026, India concluded its long-awaited deal with the European Union, which already takes about 17% of India’s exports, close to the US share of about 20-21%. Moreover, deals with the UAE and Oman open doors to the Gulf and African countries. These markets cannot fully replace America. But they give India somewhere to go, and that changes the balance at the negotiating table.
The last calculation tells us that India can afford to wait. Despite everything that has happened in 18 months, India’s exports to the US have increased to $42.79 billion in April-August 2026 from $40.39 billion a year ago. Several of India’s largest export categories to the US, including generic medicines and smartphones, are not subject to the current 10% levy. Ajay Srivastava, a former Indian trade negotiator, summed up the government’s thinking well: India realises that delaying, or even abandoning, a rushed deal “may be more prudent than locking into obligations whose costs could far exceed any temporary tariff relief”
Washington sees India as one of the world’s most protected large markets. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has called India “very protectionist” on tariffs. He said what Washington simply wants: Reasonable access for American businesses to Indian markets, in exchange for special access for India in sectors it cares about. In 2024, the US recorded a trade deficit of about $45.7 billion with India. Greer has spoken of a “serious lack of reciprocity” in the relationship. India ran a surplus of nearly $34 billion with the US in 2025-26.
On Russia, Washington’s case is that every barrel India buys helps Moscow pay for its war in Ukraine, and that a partner should not undercut sanctions its allies are trying to enforce. There is also frustration at India’s pace. Greer has noted that the US has concluded deals with a long list of partners while India, which started negotiating in February 2025, still has not signed. Lutnick has said India missed an early chance to get a better deal, arguing that the countries that moved first got the best terms.
Patience is a strategy, but it is not free. Several groups are paying for the delay right now. Those groups are exporters and workers. The sectors that suffered most because of US tariffs are labour-intensive: textiles and clothing(about $10.3 billion in US exports), gems and jewellery (about $12 billion), shrimp (about $2.24 billion), and leather and footwear. The US takes close to half of India’s shrimp exports. During the 50% tariff period, an Indian-made shirt that once sold for $10 cost US buyers $16.40, against $14.20 from China, $13.20 from Bangladesh and $12 from Vietnam. Experts already warned that uncertainty hurts. Some US buyers have stopped placing the large orders and are spreading purchases across different countries. The 100% threat is real. The Russia sanctions law gives Trump power; if he chooses to use the full power against India, the damage would dwarf anything seen so far. A waiver is possible, but India cannot count on one. The rupee is already trading close to record lows. Another tariff shock could hit business sentiment, markets and the rupee together. Every month without a deal gives competitors like Vietnam, Bangladesh and Mexico a chance to lock in US buyers who may not come back.
Plus, some experts who defend India’s stand think New Delhi has not been clear enough. Srivastava has said India’s position, cutting Russian purchases without stopping them, leaves it in a “strategic grey zone”, adding that “ambiguity no longer works”. His advice is that India should state its policy on Russian oil plainly, rather than let Washington define it.
None of these risks makes a bad deal a good one. But they do mean India’s strategy has a shelf life. Waiting works only if it leads somewhere: to clearer US tariffs, a better offer after the midterms, or a leaders’ deal that protects India’s red lines.
The next few months will show whether India’s patience pays off. Currently, the four moments matter a lot. Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State, is expected to visit India later this month, and two-way talks could make some progress. Second, there is a possibility of a Modi-Trump call. Both leaders spoke on September 30 and are expected to speak again soon to review progress. If Linscott is right, this is where the deal will be won or lost. Another moment can be November 3, the result date of the US midterm elections. The result might shape how much leverage the Trump administration has. Last, it is expected that Modi is going to visit the US for the G20 leaders meeting, the most natural moment for a signing if the gaps close. In the background, two decisions will set the real terms: whether Trump uses or waives the Russia tariff powers against India, and what the Section 301 probe concludes.
It is tempting to judge trade talks by speed, as if the country that signs first wins. The past year suggests the opposite. Europe, Japan and South Korea signed quickly. They accepted 15% tariffs, opened their markets and pledged well over a trillion dollars between them, and then watched a court rewrite the rules under them, while still being held to their promises.
India chose a different path. It accepted a framework but would not sign while the price kept moving. It opened some markets but refused to put its small farmers up against America’s subsidised mega-farms. It diversified its oil purchases, including from the US, but would not let Washington switch off its energy supply. And it used the time to sign deals with Britain and Europe.
The strategy carries real risks, especially for exporters and workers in textiles, shrimp and jewellery, and for the rupee. It works only if it ends in a better deal, not no deal. But as things stand, India is paying a lower US tariff than the countries that rushed, without having surrendered its farmers or its energy security.
India is not refusing a trade deal. It is refusing to accept risks in an uncertain and unpredictable political scenario in the USA.
With the Black Sea grain ships in danger, the Strait of Hormuz fertiliser crunch, and a Super El Niño on top of all that, a global food supply crisis is said to be looming over the world. This article offers a complete analysis and arithmetic of India’s food grain situation.
As India charges toward 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030, solar surges and nighttime wind variations present a critical operational test for the national grid. Beyond generation capacity, the real crucible of the clean energy transition lies in storage. This first instalment of a three-part series examines the five technical storage vectors identified by the Union government—from closed-loop mechanical systems to chemical vectors—and the pan-Indian transmission network engineering 24×7 dispatchable power.
Why are wheat sowing, DAP fertiliser supply, and water management in the Rabi season 2026 most crucial for the country’s food security? Understand from this special article.
Selected issues, clear explanations and thoughtful perspectives—delivered when we publish.
