dhruv
I’m a researcher and writer interested in politics, history, media, and contemporary affairs. My work focuses on digging into facts, examining narratives, and understanding the ideas and events shaping India and its public discourse.
Here is something amazing: India buys almost nine out of every ten barrels of crude it uses from abroad, yet it is the world’s second-largest exporter of refined fuel. This single fact explains much of the global oil story of the last four years.
In August 2026, war in the Gulf choked the Strait of Hormuz, and Russian fuel terminals smouldered under drone attacks; Europe went looking for diesel. It found most of it in one place. According to the tanker tracker Vortexa, Indian refiners supplied around 60% of the diesel moving to Europe through the Bab el-Mandeb strait that month.
This is not because of a bad summer, but it is a result of decades of building some of the largest and most complex refineries on Earth. It is engineered to process almost any crude, from the Gulf grades to Russian Urals to tar like Venezuelan heavy oil, and of a foreign policy that refuses to pick a single supplier or a single side across the world. In effect, India became the petrol pump of the world. It does not own all the oil, but it has machinery that turns the crude into the fuels that trucks, ships and aircraft of the world actually burn.
This article will go through the three shocks. Every shock will define how cleverly India played every move. And how India claimed a number two spot as the world’s exporter of refined petroleum oil. The first shock came as Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. India quietly absorbed Russian barrels, as Europe refused to touch them. The second was Donald Trump’s tariff war of 2025. Washington punished India for doing exactly what an earlier American administration had requested. And the third is the war between Iran and Israel-USA, leading to the point that India turned from a convenient middleman to an indispensable one.
Fun fact: each shock was supposed to weaken India’s position, but ended up strengthening it. Before we talk about these three shocks, we first need to answer a simple question: How does a country like India that produces so little oil of its own become one of the world’s biggest exporters of fuel?
If we look at the strategy, India’s model is much simpler: import crude, refine it and sell the products to whoever is short. In FY 2024-25, India’s crude-import dependency was about 89%, yet it ranks as the world’s fourth-largest refiner as per capacity, with an installed capacity of 258.1 million tonnes a year. The capacity is larger than India’s own needs. In FY 2025-26, domestic consumption of petroleum products reached around 243 million tonnes, while product exports totalled about 61.5 million tonnes. The surplus is what makes India a fuel exporter rather than just a large fuel consumer.
In simple terms, India buys crude oil from whichever supplier offers the best prices. Then it processes it in highly efficient refineries and sells the finished fuels to other countries. The margin between what it pays for crude and what it earns from selling petrol, diesel and other products counts as a profit. This difference is also known as the “crack spread.”
One company dominates this trade. Reliance Industries, owned by Mukesh Ambani, accounts for over 70% of India’s refined fuel exports. Jamnagar refinery is the largest single-site oil refinery in the world, with two plants totalling roughly 1.36 million barrels a day.
Does Jamnagar matter just because of its size? No, Jamnagar is important for two reasons beyond its size. First, it is highly complex: it can process heavy, sour, “difficult” crudes that simpler refineries cannot, which lets it buy the cheaper barrels on the market. Second, one of its two plants is an export-only refinery inside a Special Economic Zone, which keeps its output legally separate from fuel sold inside India. That separation became crucial when Europe changed its sanctions rules.
Reliance is not alone in India’s refining story either; Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum are the state refiners, which also serve the domestic market. Indian Oil is one of the largest, with a refining capacity of about 80.75 million tonnes a year. It is set to rise to 98.05 million tonnes by the end of 2026 through its biggest-ever expansion. The company says surplus output after domestic needs will go to exports. Indian Oil has a refinery in Odisha, with a complexity score of 12.2. It was built to process heavy, high-sulphur crude. If we talk about other refineries, HPCL- Mittal Energy’s Guru Gobind Singh refinery at Bathinda scores even higher, at 12.6. Moreover, HPCL is building a new refinery in Rajasthan, whose cost was raised to ₹79,459 crore in April 2026.
Nayara Energy is 49% owned by Russia’s Rosneft. It runs the large Vadinar refinery in Gujarat and is another notable exporter. It can run up to 80% heavy and ultra-heavy crude. Nayara Energy was long India’s second-largest fuel exporter, but after the EU sanctions, its exports fell 15% in 2025. And state-run Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals (MRPL) overtook it.
After analysing how Jamnagar matters to India, it is important to look at what India actually sells to the world. Because the mix of products explains why some countries depend on Indian refineries so heavily. Petrol and diesel make up about two-thirds of India’s refined product exports. Diesel is the fuel of heavy vehicles and machinery like trucks, tractors, generators and ships. And Europe needs this most. India also exports jet fuels and gasoline blending components to the US East Coast, plus smaller volumes of other products, while importing LPG and petroleum coke.
The best ability of Indian refineries is that they can switch between Gulf crude, Russian Urals, and Venezuelan heavy oil. They were built with deep conversion capacity, with units that crack the heavy, sulphur-laden bottom of the barrel into clean diesel and petrol. Over 25 years, that engineering choice has been the real foundation of India’s emergence as the world’s petrol pump.
Most people think that crude is the same everywhere or that it is a uniform product, a black liquid. But in reality, Crude from different oilfields can differ hugely in thickness and sulphur content. Additionally, these differences decide how hard it is to refine, what fuels it yields, and how much it costs. Crude oil varies hugely.
Mostly, Refiners judge it on two numbers: API gravity (how light or heavy it is; higher means lighter) and sulphur content (below about 0.5% is “sweet”, above is “sour”). In simpler terms, Light sweet crude is easy to refine and expensive, but Heavy sour crude is difficult to refine and cheap. It is important to mention that most Gulf crude is not actually “sweet”. Saudi, Iraqi and Kuwaiti export grades are mostly medium sour. That is exactly why Russian Urals slotted so easily into Indian refineries in 2022. Its quality is close to the Gulf grades they already ran. The swap was largely a change of supplier, not a change of chemistry.
And we talk about the extreme case; then Venezuela is the one. Its flagship Merey 16 is itself a blend: PDVSA mixes near-solid Orinoco crude with lighter oil at roughly three parts heavy to one part light to make it pumpable. It carries around 262 ppm of vanadium, a metal that poisons refinery catalysts, and it cannot be processed economically by simple or medium-complexity refineries.
A simple refinery only boils crude oil and separates it into different parts. With heavy crude, this leaves behind a lot of thick sludge that sells for very little. A complex refinery has extra units that turn this sludge into useful fuel. Vacuum distillation separates the heavier parts of the oil that won’t boil normally. The delayed coker then heats the thickest sludge until it breaks down into lighter liquids, leaving behind solid petroleum coke. This is the most important unit for handling heavy Venezuelan crude.
Other units turn these heavy oils into fuel people can use. The fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) breaks heavy oil into petrol, while the hydrocracker uses hydrogen to make high-quality diesel and jet fuel. Hydrotreaters remove sulphur so the diesel is clean enough to meet strict standards like Euro VI. Finally, the removed sulphur is collected and sold as a by-product.
The industry measures how advanced a refinery is using the Nelson Complexity Index (NCI). Basic distillation counts as 1, and each extra unit adds more points. The higher the score, the better a refinery is at turning cheap, low-quality crude into valuable fuel.
The answer is simple: it is economics. To understand the logic, first, we need to see how crude oil works. Crude oil comes in two broad types: Light, low-sulphur crude and Heavy, high-sulphur crude.
Low-sulphur crude is easy to refine, so many refiners want it, and it sells at a higher price. But High-sulphur crude is hard to refine, so fewer buyers want it, and it sells cheaper. Most refiners can only process low-sulphur crude, but here is the first advantage: Jamnagar can handle difficult kinds as well. Therefore, Reliance can buy cheaper crude and still produce the same petrol and diesel as everyone else with the same selling price. The margin is added as an extra profit, which is why Jamnagar has long earned higher margins than the Singapore refining benchmark. It is the primary regional benchmark for oil-refining profitability in Asia, measuring the difference between crude-oil costs and the market value of petroleum products produced by a typical complex refinery in Singapore.
The second advantage is Venezuelan crude. Basically, each type of crude yields a different mix of fuels, and heavy Venezuelan crude, when run through a complex refinery, yields a larger share of diesel and jet fuel than many lighter grades. Today, these types of fuels are in short supply in the world, especially in Europe. Therefore, Venezuelan oil is both cheap to buy and rich in the most valuable products.
And the third advantage completes the picture: location and logistics. India’s big export refineries sit on the Gujarat and Odisha coasts. The deep-water ports where large tankers can dock directly have vast storage tanks that can hold several types of crude at once, and they can blend different crudes, such as Russian, Iraqi and Venezuelan crude, into the exact mix their units need. Eventually, when one supplier is cut off by sanctions or war, they can easily switch to another within weeks. A simpler refinery built around a single type of crude cannot adapt so quickly. But the flexibility comes at a cost. Heavy, high-sulphur crude needs more hydrogen to remove the sulphur; moreover, it uses more energy and requires more maintenance. It leaves behind petroleum coke, a solid, coal-like by-product plus it generally produces more carbon emissions per barrel. But in a world where wars and sanctions keep disrupting oil supplies, the ability to process almost any crude and change suppliers quickly proved worth far more than it costs. That is what allows India to act as the world’s petrol pump.
India is the 2nd largest exporter of refined petroleum. Only the United States exports more refined fuel than India. In 2025, India shipped a record 1.28 million barrels a day of refined products. According to Kpler, it is up 4% from the year before. The share of Reliance alone accounted for about 71%. In value terms, India’s petroleum product exports earned $53.8 billion in FY2025-26.
That was lower than the previous year mainly because global fuel prices fell; export volumes dipped only slightly. The Gulf crisis has since pushed earnings sharply higher: 42.6% year on year to $30.2 billion. According to the global ranking for 2024, India stood second at $70.2 billion, behind the US at $117.5 billion and ahead of the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and China. Since then, India’s lead over its rival has widened. In July 2026, Russia’s product exports fell to 1.18 million barrels a day, the lowest in a decade. It happened after Ukrainian drone strikes knocked out over a third of its refining capacity. China limits its exports through quotas and banned diesel exports entirely in September. It is important to add that the ranking might hide that the Netherlands and Singapore are trading hubs that import, blend and re-export fuel, and South Korea sells mostly within Asia-Pacific. India, like the US, is a genuine refining powerhouse that turns imported crude into finished fuel and ships it across continents.
Since 2025, every major economy has been constrained, while India has kept running. Because of the ongoing war, Russian economy was shrinking. The cumulative effects of the EU ban, sanctions and Ukrainian drone strikes on refiners and terminals cut its seaborne diesel exports to about 150,000 barrels a day in August 2026. It was 610,000 barrels lower than a year earlier. Plus, the US is pulling back from Europe’s eastern route; American diesel shipments to Europe through the Bab el-Mandeb fell sharply in August 2026. Moreover, China restricts exports. When war in the Gulf pushed fuel prices up, China protected its own domestic supply first. Beijing manages fuel exports through quotas and banned diesel exports outright for September 2026. Meanwhile, Gulf refiners are trapped. Major refineries in Kuwait, the UAE and eastern Saudi Arabia can only ship their fuel out through the Strait of Hormuz, which has been closed or disrupted for much of 2026. Even when they produce the fuel, they cannot often get it to buyers.
India’s role as the world’s balancing refinery was born in the spring of 2022. When Russia started its ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine, Europe moved to cut off Russian crude, and millions of barrels a day suddenly had no buyer, which led to the risk of increasing prices in the market. If those barrels had simply vanished, prices would have exploded for everyone, from Delhi to Detroit. Instead of boycotting Russian oil, India started buying the oil at a discounted rate as it was going along with the national interests. Because of this, Russia’s share of India’s crude imports jumped from 1-2% before the war to around 35.8% in 2024-25.
It was more like a giant game of musical chairs. India bought discounted Russian crude. The Middle Eastern crude that India used to buy was freed up and flowed to Europe instead. Then India refined part of its crude into diesel and sold some of it to Europe as well. So, the whole story was: No barrel disappeared, but they just changed hands. Overall, Global supply stayed roughly the same, which is why there was no effect on the price after the initial spike. In FY 2022-23, Indian refiners earned around $29 billion from diesel exports alone as fuel prices soared.
At the start of the Ukraine war, Western policy was designed in a way that the G7 imposed a price cap on Russian crude. Non-Western buyers could keep purchasing it, but Western shipping and insurance companies could only buy if the price was sold below the cap. The aim was to keep buying the oil to stabilise the market while squeezing the Kremlin’s earnings.
In May 2024, then US ambassador to India, Eric Garcetti, claimed that “They bought Russian oil because we wanted somebody to buy Russian oil at a price cap. That was not a violation or anything. It was actually the design of the policy because, as a commodity, we didn’t want the oil prices going up, and they fulfilled that.” He claimed that India bought Russian oil because Washington wanted someone to buy it at the capped price. Moreover, he described it as the very design of the policy, because the US did not want oil prices rising.
But in reality, India’s decision never depended on Washington’s approval. New Delhi kept buying Russian oil in 2022 and afterwards. Despite those warnings, it made economic sense for a country that imports nearly 90% of its crude. As External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar later put it, India buys oil “based on cost and availability,” and at the time, much of the available oil was Russian because Europe was buying up the Middle Eastern supplies India traditionally used. In other words, Washington’s support came after the fact. India was acting in its own national interest, and the US simply found that useful.
In August 2025, India faced the sharpest backlash over what Washington had once encouraged. US President Trump imposed tariffs totalling 50% on Indian goods, the highest on any Asian country, including a 25% penalty specifically for buying Russian oil and arms. Trump’s charge was blunt: India was buying huge volumes of Russian oil and reselling much of it on the open market for big profits. Yet Washington was still trading with Russia itself. India’s foreign ministry pointed out that the US continued to import Russian uranium hexafluoride for its nuclear industry, palladium for its electric-vehicle industry, and fertilisers and chemicals. When reporters asked Trump about this, he replied, “I don’t know anything about it.”Its stance on Russian oil seemed to shift with its own interests rather than any fixed principle.
In response, New Delhi was more inclined towards history. Indian foreign minister said that the targeting of India was “unjustified and unreasonable” and pointed out that the United States had actively encouraged such imports to strengthen global energy market stability. It added that India’s purchases were meant to keep energy predictable and affordable for Indian consumers. Adding to this, Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri said that India had been advised by friends, including the US, to buy Russian oil within the price cap.
While Washington used tariffs, the EU used rules. In July 2025, the EU adopted the 18th sanctions package that bans imports of refined products made from Russian crude, even when the refining happens in a third country such as India, with effect from 21 January, 2026. The EU also sanctioned Nayara’s Vadinar refinery and cut the price cap on Russian crude.
This was a direct hit on Reliance. Russia had supplied almost half of its crude imports in 2025, and Europe was a lucrative market for its diesel. Reliance responded by stopping Russian crude at its export-only Jamnagar refinery, completing the switch on 20 November 2025, ahead of the EU deadline. That is how Jamnagar’s export diesel can still legally enter Europe: it is now made from non-Russian crude.
At the same time, US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, which together supplied about 1.2 million of India’s 1.7 million barrels a day of Russian crude in 2025, pushed state refiners to pull back too. In the first half of January 2026, Russian seaborne crude shipments to India fell to about 125,000 barrels a day, from over a million the month before.
On 2 February 2026, Trump announced initial agreements on a trade deal which still has not been signed. US tariffs on Indian goods fell to 18%, and the 25% Russian oil penalty was scrapped. Trump claimed Modi had agreed to stop buying Russian oil and buy more from the US and potentially Venezuela.
The executive order that followed kept a safeguard clause. According to that, the US Commerce, State and Treasury departments would monitor whether India resumed Russian oil imports, and the penalty could return. But in a few weeks, the US and Israel attacked Iran, which we will discuss later.
On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel struck Iran. Within days, the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow channel that carries about a fifth of the world’s oil, was effectively shut. In early 2026, the daily flows used to be an average of 19.8 million barrels, which later fell to 2.8 million barrels. More than 700 ships were stranded on either side.
According to the Kpler estimate, the war took at least 11 million barrels a day of crude output offline. Brent crude, which had traded between $60 and $70 before the war, rose above $120 by late April and peaked above $126.
This led to massive disruption. Large economies were more vulnerable. Nearly half of India’s crude imports and 54% of its LNG imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025. In the early crisis, India also faced a difficult start. It reportedly held crude and gas stocks for only about 25 days. India’s crude imports fell to a five-year low in March 2026. Analysts warned that every $10 rise in the oil price widens India’s current account deficit by about 0.4–0.5% of GDP and adds 30–40 basis points to inflation. Yet, India not only survived, but came back stronger. It had shifted about 70% of its crude imports to routes outside Hormuz, buying from around 40 countries, while Russian oil filled much of the gap left by Gulf suppliers. By July, India had built up about 60 days of crude and LNG stocks.
Just one month after claiming India’s commitment, the US Treasury issued a 30-day waiver allowing purchases of sanctioned Russian crude. Washington’s goal was simple: to keep oil flowing and stop prices from racing toward $150. The waiver was renewed in April. Even though India never stopped buying Russian oil, but the US wanted to pretend that it was all going according to its orders.
India was already buying Russian oil, but this quantity also increased. In March, Russian imports nearly doubled to about 2 million barrels a day. In June, they hit an all-time high, averaging 2.6 million barrels a day in the first weeks, 53.5% of India’s crude imports, beating the previous record of 2.2 million set in May 2023.
The crisis has reshaped the fuel market. In August 2026, Russia’s seaborne diesel exports collapsed to about 150,000 barrels a day, and US diesel shipments to Europe via the Red Sea route fell sharply. China banned diesel exports in September, and benchmark diesel prices were roughly double their level a year earlier.
India filled the gap. In September, its diesel exports hit a one-year high of about 620,000 barrels a day, with around 280,000 going to Europe. Europe was heading into peak winter demand with low inventories, which made Indian refiners more important still.
At home, the government chose to shield consumers. In March it slashed excise duty on petrol and diesel, with Puri saying the state would take a hit on its finances rather than drastically raise pump prices. At the same time it reimposed windfall taxes on diesel and jet-fuel exports, to keep fuel inside the country.
Those taxes moved with the crisis: cut when prices eased in early summer, raised again as tensions returned. By September the diesel export tax was about $37 a barrel, but it did not apply to Reliance’s export-only Jamnagar plant, which kept shipping abroad.
The bill was still large. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimated India paid about $22 billion in extra fossil-fuel import costs between March and August 2026, with Brent averaging around $93.
While Russia and the Gulf dominated headlines, Reliance opened another tap: Venezuela. In January 2026, the US captured Nicolás Maduro, and after a subsequent deal between Caracas and Washington, Venezuelan crude began flowing to new buyers under US oversight. Reliance bought its first cargo of Venezuelan heavy crude since December 2023 from Chevron, picked up a 2-million-barrel cargo from the trader Vitol, and by April had loaded its first direct cargo from the state oil company PDVSA. It also chartered very large crude carriers, each holding about 2 million barrels, to cut freight costs on the long voyage. State refiners Indian Oil and Bharat Petroleum, and HPCL-Mittal Energy, bought Venezuelan cargoes from Trafigura as well. In April, India was set to import more than 12 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, its highest in about six years.
Venezuela fits India’s model unusually well for three reasons. The first is chemistry: Venezuelan crude is heavy and sour, which many refineries struggle to process, but Jamnagar’s complex units are built for exactly these cheap, difficult barrels. The second is geography: the crude sails to India around the Cape of Good Hope, nowhere near Hormuz, which helps India reduce its dependence on the Gulf. The third is politics: Venezuelan oil comes with Washington’s blessing, and Trump himself named Venezuela as a supplier India could turn to in place of Russia.
Venezuela will not replace Russia or the Gulf in volume any time soon: its output is still recovering from years of collapse. But it adds another option to India’s portfolio, and options are the core of India’s strategy.
Most people think that India’s advantage is Russian oil, but the reality is quite different. India’s true advantage lies in its ability to buy from almost anyone, refine almost anything, and sell to whoever wants it irrespective of Western pressure. Since 2022, India has run its crude supply as an investment portfolio. Russia and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, the United States, Venezuela, West Africa and Latin America all feed its refineries; the mix shifts as prices and politics change. This flexibility has always helped India to achieve its national interests. On the selling side, Indian fuel goes to Europe, Brazil, Africa, Southeast Asia and the US East Coast. When one supply chain changes or breaks, India fills the gap.
This gives India a kind of leverage that oil-producing nations do not have. As a producer is tied to its own wells and pipelines, a refiner with spare capacity and diverse suppliers can change in weeks and move according to the crisis.
This model also comes with real strains. The first is Geopolitical pressure. India is welcomed when the West needs the oil but targeted when the West wants to punish Russia. And it is the same with Washington: the Russian oil purchases were praised by Washington in 2024, penalised with tariffs in 2025 and allowed again through waivers in 2026. That risk has not gone away: the US still keeps a safeguard clause on India’s Russian oil imports, and the new sanctions law Trump signed in September 2026 allows tariffs of up to 100% on Russia’s biggest oil buyers.
The second is the tension between home and abroad. During a crisis, the government taxes or restricts fuel exports to protect Indian consumers, which limits how much India can supply the world the very moment the world needs it most, as it becomes a matter of its own national interests. The Jamnagar export-only refinery is the one that is exempt from these export taxes, to maintain the balance.
Nobody can predict the future, but there is always the possibility of thinking through how it might unfold. India’s role as the world’s petrol pump will depend mainly on two things: whether the Gulf stays disrupted, and how the West chooses to treat Russian oil. Based on these, three different scenarios are likely to unfold. Scenarios are an analytical framework, not forecasts.
If Hormuz reopens for good and a Russia–Ukraine settlement eases sanctions. Brent drifts back toward the $60–70 range it held before the war. Gulf refineries resume full exports and Russian product shipments partly recover. But what does it mean for India? It means lower import bills, a stronger rupee and easier inflation. Plus, refining margins might shrink, so Reliance earns less per barrel, but India’s position in the market will be stronger. Cheap Russian crude could return, which might reopen friction with Washington over the February deal’s safeguard clause. The problem with this scenario is that the whole possibility lies with Hormuz, and the chance of Hormuz being normal in the near future is lower.
If Hormuz stays on-and-off for months or years. This is the scenario in which India’s role grows most. Europe’s diesel supply, already concentrated on Indian refiners, becomes even more dependent on them, and Asian and African buyers line up too. But it is a painful success, as India’s own import bill, inflation and currency all suffer, and the government must keep juggling consumer subsidies and export taxes. In this scenario, Reliance’s refining profits soar while the wider economy has to face problems.
The third scenario is about the sanctions that India might face. If Washington or Brussels decides India’s renewed Russian purchases breach its commitments, or Donald Trump’s administration displays another phase of unpredictability. Then US tariffs could return, and the EU might tighten proof-of-origin checks on fuel. India would then lean harder on markets that care less about crude origin: Africa, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia. The possibility is much higher, as recently Trump signed a new order Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, that gives him the power to impose tariffs of up to 100% on the five biggest buyers of Russian oil and gas. As India is one of the biggest buyers, it is directly exposed. However, the law gives the US President wide freedom to waive these penalties, so whether India is actually hit remains a political decision. This would not end India’s refining role, but it would cut it off from its most lucrative customers and force more complicated, segregated supply chains.
Four years ago, India was an oil importer with big refineries. Today, it is the world’s balancing refinery, the place where stranded, sanctioned, and surplus crude is turned into the fuel that keeps the engines of the world moving.
Its path has been full of contradictions. The same Russian purchases were encouraged by one American administration, penalised by the next, and then waived again when the Gulf burned. Europe banned diesel made from Russian crude and then leaned on Indian diesel more than ever. What ties these together is usefulness. India stays indispensable because it is useful to almost everyone at once: to Western governments that need prices kept in check, to Russia and Venezuela that need buyers, and to fuel-short markets from Rotterdam to São Paulo. That same balancing act is also its greatest risk, because a country useful to everyone can be pressured by everyone.
Despite an $83 billion defence budget and advanced American weaponry, Saudi Arabia remains fundamentally vulnerable to Yemen’s Houthi rebels.
Why is India delaying or taking so much time to make this deal possible? There is no single answer to that, but if we put the pieces together, India’s go-slow approach starts to make sense and more like a strategy. It rests on five calculations.
With the Black Sea grain ships in danger, the Strait of Hormuz fertiliser crunch, and a Super El Niño on top of all that, a global food supply crisis is said to be looming over the world. This article offers a complete analysis and arithmetic of India’s food grain situation.
Selected issues, clear explanations and thoughtful perspectives—delivered when we publish.
